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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Almost daily we are confronted with news concerned with civil wars, its destructiveness and 
the attempts made by various actors to initiate or manage a peace process. Civil wars cause 
enormous suffering and instability throughout the world (Sambanis, 2002: 215). And due to 
its complex and indecisive nature, resolving the conflict, thus terminating the civil war and 
establishing a durable peace is a tedious process and a task that presents many difficulties and 
challenges. It is a task however, many should and do care about.    
 One of the difficulties presented during civil war termination is spoiling behavior. 
Some actors perceive peace as a threat and use violence to disrupt, thus spoil, the peace 
process (Stedman, 1997). The effects of spoiling behavior are, counterintuitively, not always 
detrimental to a peace process. Research has shown that renewed violence can remind 
everyone of the costs of fighting which makes spoiling behavior unpopular with the public. 
Spoiling behavior can result in an increase in international pressure to negotiate or hold on to 
an agreement. And spoiling behavior can increase awareness that other actors or interests 
need to be included in negotiations (Reiter, 2015; Newman and Richmond, 2006).  
 Most research on spoiling behavior though, concludes that its effects are detrimental 
for a peace process. Thus, scholars find that in cases where spoiling occurs, peace is 
threatened and peace processes are most likely to fail (Stedman, 1997; Darby, 2001). The 
nuances in the effects of spoiling behavior, such as the counterintuitive and possible 
productive effects mentioned above, are not completely ignored by those engaged in the 
study of conflict resolution and spoiling behavior. However, these effects lack research.  
 A reason for this literature gap has to do with an overall and general lack of clarity in 
terms of causality between spoiler behavior and the outcome of a peace process (Nilsson and 
Kovaks, 2011). In other words, the causal pathways between the effects of spoiling behavior 
and the outcome of a peace process are often not made transparent. As such, there is no clear 
understanding of the overall effects of spoiling on a peace process. Subsequently, it is 
necessary to capture the range of effects spoiling can have on a peace process and look 
beyond those cases where spoiling behavior was present and peace has failed.  
 In order to test and further build upon existing theories of spoiling, it is of interest to 
examine the more nuanced and least expected effects of spoiling behavior, thus, the 
counterintuitive and possible productive effects. This thesis is an endeavor to do precisely 
that by providing causal clarity between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a 
peace process. Subsequently, my research question is: Under what conditions can spoiling 
behaviour be productive for a peace process?     
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 This thesis is structured as follows: First, the literature review will depict two major 
findings within the state of the art on spoiling behavior applicable to this research. 
Subsequently, I will elaborate on theories of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory as 
the appropriate theoretical framework for this study. The two main hypotheses, derived from 
the literature review and within the context of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory, 
conclude the first two chapters of this thesis.       
 Next is the presentation of the research design which is structured around the method 
of process tracing. The peace process of Mali, Africa between 2013 and 2015 is the 
instrumental case study for testing the proposed hypotheses and tracing the causality between 
spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of the peace process. Mali’s peace process is a 
case in which spoiling behavior has challenged the peace process, yet peace agreements have 
been signed and the peace process has not failed. So, it is an outlier case of mainstream 
theories of spoiling behavior, hence a case well-suited to research the possible productive 
effects of spoiling behavior. After elaborating on indicators and variables, case study 
selection and data collection in subsequent parts, the analysis of the research is conducted in 
chapter six and seven. 
VALIDITY 
With this study I  provide transparency on the causality between spoiling behavior, its effects 
and the outcome of a peace process. By focusing on the more nuanced effects of spoiling 
behavior and by tracing in detail causal pathways, I have identified an explanatory causal 
mechanism between spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process. So, through this 
research an increase in knowledge is gained on how the specific process works, not just what 
the specific process entails.         
 The research design of this thesis enhances internal and external validity of findings 
in the following ways. First, through the method of process tracing, this study of the peace 
process in Mali has spelled out the effects of spoiling behavior in Mali. The internal validity 
of findings is high due to the chosen method of analysis and due to the contribution this study 
makes to existing literature on spoiling behavior.       
 The use of a single case study is often critiqued for the limitation it poses in terms of 
“how far the findings from one case study may be generalized to other contexts” (Halperin 
and Heath, 2012: 208). Nonetheless, by drawing upon theories of Conflict Resolution and 
Bargaining Theory when examining spoiling behavior and identifying a causal mechanism, 
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findings become part of a wider debate, adding to this study’s external validity (Waldner, 
2015: 76).  
RELEVANCE 
This research fills a gap in the literature on spoiling behavior by providing transparency of 
the causal relationship between the effects of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace 
process. By focusing on the possible productive effects of spoiling behavior, existing theories 
of spoiling are tested and further built upon. Furthermore, as mentioned before, ending civil 
wars is complex. Hence, when the effects of violence, in this case spoiling behavior, are well 
understood and the causal mechanism between its effects and the outcome of a peace process 
is clarified, there will be a deepened knowledge of the threat or opportunities spoiling 
behavior poses to a peace process. As such, peacemakers will be empowered with that 
deepened knowledge aiding them in the management of spoilers during peace processes. 
2. SPOILING BEHAVIOR; A LITERATURE REVIEW 
The specific research focus is established by evaluating the state of the art on spoiling 
behavior and this literature review is structured around two major findings derived from this 
topic. First finding is the opacity of the causal relationship between spoiling behavior, its 
effects and the outcome of a peace process. And second finding has to do with clarifying the 
research goal and using the relevant typology of spoiling behavior accordingly.  
 The majority of studies concerned with spoiling behavior assume it poses a significant 
threat to peace. Steadman argues that spoilers are the largest obstacle to peace (1997). And 
Walter states that extremists are successful in undermining peace efforts when they desire to 
do so (2002). As argued by Reiter, these prevailing views are based upon research conducted 
on case studies in which the peace process has failed oftentimes or lasted very long, such as 
the intractable conflicts of Israel-Palestine and Colombia. And in these cases spoiling 
behavior has had notable detrimental effects (2015: 91).     
 The effects of spoiling behavior are more nuanced though, as suggested by some other 
scholars. Violent spoiling behavior can remind everyone of the hardships it brings, making it 
unpopular. International actors might respond to spoiling by a variety of means, such as an 
increase in diplomatic pressure to negotiate an agreement and/or an increase in resources 
(Richmond and Newmond, 2006; Sisk, 2006). And, “spoiling can contribute to a stronger 
peace by forcing changes to the protocols or by the inclusion of new actors that increase the 
effectiveness of the agreement” (Reiter, 2015: 91). An example of a situation in which 
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spoiling behavior resulted in an increase in international resources is the peace process in El 
Salvador in 1992. After several violent spoiling acts aimed at spoiling the peace agreement 
signed by the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the 
United Nations (UN) officials arrived and successfully averted the crisis (Wantchekon, 
1999).            
 So, there is a wider range of spoiling behavior effects that needs to be considered in 
order to evaluate what spoiling behavior means for a peace process. As such, it is necessary 
to look beyond those intractable conflict cases when analyzing spoiling behavior in order to 
address this critical issue in the debate.        
 When answering the research question of this thesis, it is vital to note that spoiling 
behavior is not always aimed at ending a peace process (Nilsson and Kovaks, 2011). Parties 
differ in terms of their objectives, incentives and capabilities. For example, spoilers who 
actually want a peace process to fail can fail in their attempts to do so. This happened in 1994 
when, in Israel, Hamas and Islamic Jihad conducted attacks in order to persuade the Israeli 
government to abandon the peace process. They failed however as key parties remained 
committed to the agreement and continued to meet on a regular base (Reiter, 2015: 97).  
 Other spoilers might want to shape a peace process as they have been left out of 
negotiations. The peace process of Mali in 1991 presents such a case as the Popular 
Liberation Front of Azawad or the Front Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad (FPLA), a 
party left out of the peace process, resorted to spoiling in an attempt to undermine it and gain 
also the dividends of peace. They eventually were included during peace negotiations 
resulting in the signage of the comprehensive National Pact peace treaty in April 1992 (Ibid: 
102). Ultimately, these spoilers want their interests included in peace negotiations and use 
violence to achieve that goal. And they as well can fail or succeed depending on their 
capabilities and/or the significance of their demands for the viability of the peace process. In 
this light, spoiling behavior is argued to be a bargaining tool and the effects should fall 
anywhere short of actual failing a peace process (Greenhill and Major, 2007; Zahar, 2006).
 Stedman also acknowledges the differences between spoilers. He divides them into 
three specific categories: total, limited and opportunistic spoilers. Total spoilers seek to 
destroy the peace process, limited spoilers want to modify the peace process in a way that 
serves them better when peace is achieved and opportunistic spoilers want either, depending 
on the cost-benefit calculation of the current situation (Stedman, 1997).    
 The distinctions between these types of spoilers and spoiling behavior and/or their 
motivations are blurry and overlap between studies. Scholars thus have adopted different 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
13 
 
typologies for spoilers and spoiling behavior throughout their research. This has to do with 
overlapping research goals. Some scholars are interested in preventing spoilers by identifying 
potential spoilers. And some scholars are concerned with managing them, thus evaluating 
manifest spoilers (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011: 607-615).      
 Accordingly, Nilsson and Kovacs argue that research goals should be made clear and 
a distinction should be made between the “prevention of spoilers and the management of 
spoilers” (Ibid: 624). Clarifying these distinctions will solve the blurriness of existing 
typologies for spoilers and spoiling behavior, reduce the polemic character of the current 
debate and identify those issues relevant to the specific research. For example, when 
concerned with the management of spoiling behavior, as I am in this thesis, empirically 
observed actions are relevant to the research. So, the actors and their goals are of larger 
importance than their private incentives to resort to spoiling (Ibid, 624-625).  
 Despite the ambiguities in the debate, it has become evident that not all aspects of 
spoiling behavior are of equal relevance to the outcome of a peace process. Spoilers might or 
might not be capable of achieving their goals and their demands might or might not be 
realizable. Reiter concludes, after asking the question whether or not spoiling works, that 
those actors that have the military ability to prevent implementation are a threat to a peace 
agreement (2015: 106). In addition, relevant actors, in terms of military capability, are not 
always ready or willing to negotiate. They might be only interested in terminating all 
attempts made towards peace. When they are strong and willing to negotiate though, they 
should be included in peace negotiations as they could pose a significant threat to the peace 
process when they are not engaged. In turn, when they are strong and unwilling to negotiate, 
they need to be weakened, thus eliminated as a threat (Ibid).     
 Moreover, goals and demands of spoilers are often unrealizable or insignificant in 
terms of representativeness of the population. Two examples are illustrative of these findings. 
First, when Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, in 1991 demanded absolute power 
after signing a peace agreement, he resorted to full scale attacks when his demands were not 
met. His demands though were unrealizable as all parties would oppose the former President 
regaining absolute power which would break up the peace process. So, interests were not 
realizable, thus not relevant for the peace process (Waugh, 2011). Second, the Songhay 
ethnic groups in northern Mali, 1994, represented a large ethnic group who were excluded 
from peace negotiations as they had not been a major player during the civil war. They were 
concerned with the division of material concessions, like opportunities for state employment, 
set forth in existing peace agreements (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 20). The exclusion of 
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these actors’ interests sparked renewed violence and undermined the peace process. 
Consequently, instability and insecurity remained in northern Mali as a significant size of the 
population of Mali had not been heard, resulting in subsequent rebellions. So, these interests 
were representative of a significant size of the population, hence should have been included 
in peace negotiations.         
 Ultimately, it can be argued there is a relationship between the capabilities and the 
goals and demands of spoilers, the effects of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace 
process (Reiter, 2015: 624). As such, the puzzle that needs to be solved entails finding the 
specific causal pathways linking certain factors of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a 
peace process together. The usage of appropriate typologies is essential in doing so. 
 For the purpose of this thesis and the endeavor to analyze the causal pathways and 
solve this puzzle, I take into account the typology distinctions made throughout the literature, 
yet, converge it into two categories appropriate for the development of strategies for spoiler 
management; relevant actors and relevant interests. These two categories acknowledge the 
important insights of the current spoiler debate and aid this research by summarizing these 
important insights into measurable categories. I will elaborate more on conceptualization and 
operationalization in chapter five of this thesis.      
 In sum of the literature on spoiling behavior, it has first become apparent that in most 
cases scholars assume that spoiling behavior is detrimental for a peace process. Yet, it is not 
clear how this is manifested (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011: 613). So, the causal pathways need 
to be made clear in order to assess the effects of spoiling behavior, the outcome of a peace 
process and ultimately establish the causal mechanism between both.  
 Lastly, it is necessary for all further research concerned with spoiling behavior, to 
clarify the research goal and use appropriate typologies  in order to avoid further ambiguities 
within the spoiling debate and establish findings useful for further research. Hence, when 
concerned with increasing and deepening the knowledge of those who manage spoiling it is 
necessary to focus on spoiling behavior in which there are relevant actors and relevant 
interests to be identified. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to answer the research question, “under what conditions can spoiling behavior be 
productive for a peace process?”, one must be familiar with theories of Conflict Resolution 
and Bargaining Theory. Both theories have contextualized a peace process and provide for 
insights on the complexity of a peace process, thus are applicable and useful for this research. 
3.1. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Throughout the literature concerned with civil war termination, scholars mostly consider four 
possible outcomes of civil wars bringing the warring parties to lay down their arms: Victory, 
a peace agreement, a cease fire and other (Kreutz, 2010: 244-245). The latter category entails 
those cases in which there have been no victory and/or agreement. For example, the conflict 
might have changed from intrastate to interstate and/or a warring party could have 
withdrawn.
1
 In this light, multiple studies have shown that since the end of the Cold War, the 
majority of civil wars ended in negotiated settlements, often with third party assistance 
(Babbitt, 2009). So, in the majority of contemporary civil wars, through peace agreements, 
warring parties agree to lay down their arms and resolve incompatibilities. Subsequently, 
scholars have tried to  “better understand the negotiation and dispute resolution dynamics in 
civil and regional conﬂict situations where parties have turned to negotiated approaches to 
resolve their differences” (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011: 47). These endeavors have converged 
into a greater interest in Conflict Resolution theories.      
 Explained by Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman: “Conflict Resolution is about 
ideas, theories, and methods that can improve our understanding of conflict and our collective 
practice of reduction in violence and enhancement of political processes for harmonizing 
interests’’ (2009). Conflict Resolution can be regarded as a settlement process and a 
transformation process in which a deal is struck and relationship- and peacebuilding efforts 
are undertaken (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011: 47). So, theories of conflict resolution are about 
the transformation of war into peace through settlements in which mutual gains have been 
negotiated.            
 By conceptualizing conflict resolution as a process, the complexity of the matter is 
recognized and there is acknowledgment of the fact that most contemporary civil wars end 
through negotiated settlements opposed to a one-sided victory. This means that it has become 
clear it is insufficient to resolve conflict and achieve peace by merely reaching a single peace 
agreement after negotiations or the successful implementation of a peace agreement 
                                                            
1 Kreutz presents the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Termination dataset in this article 
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(Hampson, 1996; Walter, 2003). Phases in the peace process overlap and negotiations do not 
cease after particular agreements have been made. Some peace agreements for example are 
not comprehensive and do not address all incompatibilities, so additional negotiations are 
required along the way.         
 As mentioned before, spoiling behavior is observed when certain actors perceive 
peace as a threat and use violence to disrupt, thus spoil, the peace process (Stedman, 1997). 
As such, spoiling behavior plays a role during the transformation of war into peace, thus 
during the peace process in which peace negotiations are undertaken and peace agreements 
are to be struck. Framing spoiling behavior within this higher level of abstraction, namely 
conflict resolution, is appropriate and adds to the external validity of this research.  
3.2. BARGAINING THEORY 
Bargaining theory, very usefully, explains why it is so difficult to end civil wars and reach a 
negotiated settlement during a peace process. As summarized by Findley, the bargaining 
model of war is based upon the premise that war is costly and there is always an agreement to 
be struck that is preferable to war as it costs less (2012: 58). These agreements are difficult to 
achieve as the warring parties are uncertain about each other’s resolve, capabilities and 
intentions. And even when a bargain can be struck there is a lack of credible commitments to 
keep or establish peace (Fearon, 1995). This means that there is no guarantee that an 
agreement will be abided by when one or more parties give up arms.   
 The private information perspective has originally been used to explain interstate 
wars. Nevertheless, many argue that information problems in civil wars matter (e.g., 
Kirshner, 2010; Mattes and Savun, 2010). More specifically, information problems could 
have considerable effects on civil war resolution (Findley, 2012: 908). For example, during a 
peace process, the situation often changes. Warring parties could split into fractions when 
specific terms of an existing or prospect agreement are unsatisfactory to all. Subsequently, 
information on the distribution of power could be revealed and a new or other, more durable, 
peace agreement can be struck as it is based upon current information in which there is less or 
no uncertainty on the distribution of power (Guelke, 2008: 76). And this disclosure of 
relevant, previously private, information could move the peace process further towards an 
actual peace agreement.         
 In sum, when there is private information between warring parties and/or between the 
warring parties and other possible relevant actors, uncertainty prevails and striking a bargain 
is inhibited (Walter, 2009). Overcoming this problem is an important step in a peace process 
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as the ability to strike a bargain between relevant parties, i.e. establish a peace agreement 
signed by relevant parties, is necessary for the sustainment of a peace process (Guelke, 2008: 
63). So, how can spoiling behavior be assessed and what hypotheses can be proposed in line 
with this broader theoretical abstract of conflict resolution and bargaining theory, more 
specifically?  
4. HYPOTHESES OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
It has become evident that a peace process faces many challenges in terms of uncertainty and 
actors’ inability to strike a bargain from which the peace process can move forward towards 
actual peace. It seems that, despite the challenges spoiling behavior on its own poses to a 
peace process, spoiling behavior could be a part of the solution to this overarching challenge. 
As discussed in the literature review, some of the more nuanced effects of spoiling behavior 
entail the inclusion of new interests and actors in the peace process. Could it be that, prior to 
the act of spoiling, information on these interests and actors were private, contributing to 
overall uncertainty and inefficient negotiations? If so, then it could be argued that spoiling 
behavior discloses information, thus reduces uncertainty and ultimately signals that a peace 
process needs to change for it to remain viable.       
 In these cases, spoiling behavior can be productive when the disclosure of information 
has been dealt with appropriately. Based upon findings within the literature on spoiling 
behavior, this means three things. First, the relevance of new actors and interests must be 
determined. Second, relevant interests must be included in peace negotiations. And third, 
actors must be included in peace negotiations when willing to negotiate and weakened when 
unwilling to negotiate. I will elaborate more on these findings in paragraph 5.2.3. when 
discussing the intervening variables.        
 From these insights I have developed the following two hypotheses in which the 
measurement of the degree of productivity for a peace process relates to the following sub 
question: Has the peace process progressed? The conceptualization and operationalization of 
all significant elements of the hypotheses will be explained in chapter five of this research. 
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H1: When spoiling behavior discloses information on a new set of relevant interests in the 
peace process, the peace process progresses when those relevant interests have been 
included in peace negotiations. 
FIGURE 1: HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 1 
 
H2: When spoiling behavior discloses information on new and relevant actors to the peace 
process, the peace process progresses when those relevant actors willing to negotiate have 
been included in peace negotiations and when those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate 
have been weakened. 
FIGURE 2: HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 2 
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1. SINGLE CASE STUDY 
A qualitative single case study is conducted in which I have analyzed the causal pathways 
between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process.  
5.1.1. THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015 
In previous paragraphs it is argued that theories of spoiling behavior assume, and in several 
cases have shown, spoiling has a detrimental effect on a peace process, hence its outcome. 
This is despite scholars’ acknowledgment of more nuanced effects of spoiling behavior and 
because of the lack of research on the same. So, selecting a case in which the peace process 
has not failed, despite the presence of spoiling behavior, is therefore an outlier case of 
mainstream theory and a crucial case for testing the assumptions concerned with the more 
nuanced and possible productive effects of spoiling behavior.    
 The peace process in Mali that started in 2013 presents such a case. Achieving peace 
in Mali is a challenge and it has been tried before. Instability and insecurity have persisted 
ever since the first rebellion in 1960 and despite of several peace agreements (Poulton and 
Youssouf, 1998). The most recent rebellion started in 2012 when Tuareg and Arab groups 
from northern Mali, strengthened by Islamist groups residing in Mali and in neighboring 
countries, gained control of most northern cities (Pezard and Shurkin, 2015). The rebellion, 
more specifically the Jihadist movement that had gained momentum because of the rebellion, 
was contained by the French led military intervention later that year. The French also 
initiated the peace process, which was made official when the main warring parties signed in 
2013 the Declaration of accession to the preliminary agreement for the presidential election 
and inclusive peace talks in Mali, popularly known as the Ouagadougou Accord.  
 Spoiling behavior has been present and ongoing since this event. The peace process 
moved forward though and in June, 2015 the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali 
was signed, ending the rebellion and civil war. It is too soon to assess the durability of peace 
as the peace process remains ongoing in subsequent implementation phases. However, the 
peace process of Mali narrowed temporally between 2013 and 2015 provides for a controlled 
and well-suited case from which hypotheses can be tested. 
5.2. VARIABLES AND INDICATORS 
5.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable (DV) of either hypothesis relates to the 
following sub question: Has the peace process progressed? It is argued by many scholars that 
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continued dialogue provides for an important indicator of progress in conflict resolution 
efforts. This coincides with findings within the literature rendering that most civil wars after 
the Cold War have been settled through negotiations (Kreutz, 2010; Babbitt, 2009).  
 In order to reduce this level of abstraction of continued dialogue towards measurable 
indicators of a peace process progressing, I use indicators set forth by the framework of 
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) of the United States Institute of 
Peace. These indicators have been filtered from a multitude of generic indicators appropriate 
for this research and in accordance with guidelines set forth in the MPICE Handbook 
(Agoglia et al, 2010). This means that these indicators are chosen based upon a research 
focus on uncertainty and the difficulties of striking a bargain, thus the findings of bargaining 
theory. And, indicators are chosen upon available data and based upon the provisions set 
forth by the Ouagadougou Accord in order to suit the conflict and peace process of Mali. 
 Consequently, the peace process progresses when the following two indicators exist: 
The conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process and political leaders and 
elites remain in acceptance with and in support of the peace process. The former is measured 
through the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms and active communication between 
various parties in which the goal is to clarify and resolve remaining vital issues among parties 
to the conflict (Agoglia et al, 2010: 22). The latter indicator is measured first through key 
parties’ renouncement and condemnation of the use of violence and then through the number 
and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by faction (Ibid: 22-23). I will 
elaborate more on the details of the indicators and measures and the provisions of the 
Ouagadougou Accord in chapter 6 of this thesis.       
5.2.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE        
The independent variable (IV) of either hypothesis is; spoiling behavior during a peace 
process and it is operationalized as: Violent acts undertaken by key individuals and parties in 
order to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process and in doing so jeopardize the 
peace efforts. Such groups can be found on the inside or the outside of the peace process and 
be either non-state actors or state-related actors. (Hogland and Zartman, 2006; Newman and 
Richmond, 2006; Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011). Furthermore, spoiling behavior is viewed in 
relation to a speciﬁc peace agreement or a publicly committed pact and it implies multiple 
violent acts that inhabit this trait. As such, it is a form of political violence, hence narrowed in 
scope. The fundamental unit of observation is the event or the violent act and this coincides 
with available datasets on political violence, such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
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Database (ACLED) and news sources reporting on political violence. Violent acts are defined 
as kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, military operations and armed attacks on civilians 
(Reiter, 2015: 92).          
 Lastly, it is essential to explain the nature of the peace process in order to establish the 
appropriate scope of this research as it directly relates to the indicators and measurement of 
the DV and the IV. The peace process is operationalized as follows: It commences when “at 
least one of the parties to the conflict is either engaged in, or committed to, a peace process” 
(Nilsson and Kovaks, 2011: 614). As such, the Ouagadougou Accord represents the start of 
the peace process as the main warring parties for the first time overtly expressed their desire 
to end the conflict. Additionally, the Ouagadougou Accord represents the agreement from 
which the IV of spoiling behavior can be assessed.         
5.2.3. INTERVENING VARIABLES  
The intervening variables (IVV) for hypothesis 1 are: A) the disclosure of information on a 
new set of interests in the peace process; B) the assessment of relevant interests; and C) the 
inclusion of those relevant interests in peace negotiations. The IVV’s for hypothesis 2 are: A) 
the disclosure of information on new actors to the peace process; B) the assessment of 
relevant actors; C1) the inclusion of those relevant actors who are willing to negotiate in 
peace negotiations; and C2) the weakening of those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate. 
The interests and actors are considered new when these interests or actors have not been 
included in peace negotiations. Interests are considered relevant when they are realizable and 
when they are representative of a significant size of the population. And actors are considered 
relevant to the peace process when their military capability is strong and when they are 
willing to negotiate as explained in chapter two.       
 It is important to note that, when new actors have weak military capabilities, 
independent of their willingness to negotiate, they could still be relevant to the peace process. 
However, their relevance would primarily depend on whether or not their interests are 
relevant to the peace process, as per hypothesis 1.    
5.3. DATA COLLECTION  
I have collected information on spoiling behavior in Mali by analyzing existing datasets, such 
as ACLED, literature and news sources such as Keesing’s Record of World Events. As 
argued by Reiter, Keesing’s Record of World Events constitutes “a respected and reliable 
source for coverage of peace processes and political violence, and it is used widely in the 
field” (2015: 94). The data on spoiling behavior entails those violent events in which the 
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perpetrators have made reference to the peace process. This means that, in order for the event 
to be coded as an act of spoiling, reference must have been made to the Ouagadougou 
Accord, its provisions and implementation and/or peace negotiations. When necessary, I have 
used the method of data triangulation, thus the use of multiple sources to contrast different 
explanations and to validate findings, to ensure accurate empirical results.   
 The data on new interests and actors has been obtained from International Crisis 
Group (ICG) reports, the databases of the UN and the United States Institute of Peace. Data 
on realizable interests and interests representative of a significant size of the population has 
been obtained from existing literature addressing the root causes of the conflict and 
demographical statistics. Additionally, the relevance of interests is assessed by evaluating the 
decision making processes before, during and after peace negotiations, thus the reports 
particular to peace negotiations.        
 Data on the indicators for relevant actors has been obtained from literature concerned 
with the Mali conflict and open sources such as the CIA World Fact Book. Data relevant to 
the inclusion of relevant interests in peace negotiations and relevant actors willing to 
negotiate has been found in the peace process reports from ICG, the databases of the UN and 
the United States Institute of Peace. This information has been weighed against information 
on spoiling behavior in order to assess whether or not the actions undertaken by peace 
makers, if any at all, have weakened those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate.   
 Finally, data on the indicators for the DV has been obtained from peace process 
reports as mentioned previously and news sources reporting on the peace process.  
 In addition to previously mentioned strategies for data collection and as proposed by 
the MPICE Framework, I have conducted two interviews with representatives of the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) who worked in the 
peacekeeping field in Mali between in 2015. The aim of these interviews has been twofold. 
First aim is to gain expert knowledge necessary to measure some of the indicators for the DV 
of interest (Agoglia et al, 2010; 22). Second aim is to gain practical knowledge on the 
evaluation of and dealing with spoiling behavior. The latter has reinforced the validity of the 
assessment of relevant interests and actors, the effects of spoiling behavior on the peace 
process and the causality between these effects and the outcome of the peace process.  
5.4. QUALITATIVE METHOD OF PROCESS TRACING  
Establishing and validating specific causal pathways is the key to answering the research 
question and contributing to existing theories of spoiling behavior. As such, it is vital for the 
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validity of this research to draw upon the method of process tracing in order to seek causal 
explanations “Process tracing is a mode of causal inference based on concatenation, not 
covariation” (Waldner, 2015: 68). So, it is a process in which conclusions are derived from a 
detailed analysis of a sequence or chain of events that are linked together. The ultimate goal 
is to not only find the causal pathways between a causal factor and a certain outcome, but 
also identify the explanatory causal mechanism between the two. For the purpose of this 
thesis, this means that the ultimate goal is to understand why and how spoiling behaviour has 
been productive for the peace process.     
 Additionally, process tracing allows for the “exploration of causal ideas embedded in 
the narratives, the consideration of the kinds of evidence that may conﬁrm or disconﬁrm 
these ideas, and the identification of the tests appropriate for evaluating this evidence” 
(Collier, 2011, 828-829). Subsequently, an important element throughout this research will be 
the confirmation of proposed hypotheses through consideration and falsification of kinds of 
evidence, tests and alternative hypotheses that could disconfirm the proposed hypotheses. So, 
in order to strengthen the analysis, I consider, besides the proposed hypotheses of information 
disclosure, an alternative causal pathway that could move forward the peace process. 
5.5. SOME LIMITATIONS 
This study is limited in three ways. First, it is limited to violent tactics of spoiling behavior. 
Non-violent behavior could also have an effect on a peace process as argued by Pearlman 
(2009: 79). There has not yet been much research on this finding and it has been 
acknowledged that more work needs to be done. This is however beyond the scope of this 
research.            
 A second, yet central limitation of this thesis is the vast amount of violent acts to be 
observed during the peace process and the limited availability of primary sources. The peace 
process of Mali is assessed as a conflict environment that falls into state zero of the three 
objective states on the trajectory toward sustainable peace as proposed by the MPICE 
framework. This means that “drivers of violent conflict persist which requires the active and 
robust presence of external military forces, in partnership with a sizable international civilian 
presence, to perform vital functions such as imposing order, reducing violence, delivering 
essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political 
framework pursuant to a peace accord” (Agoglia et al, 2010: xiv). So, violence on the part of 
spoilers is difficult to distinguish from normal violence associated with the conflict. 
 Additionally, when it is not known that peace negotiations are ongoing, or peace 
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negotiations are temporally spaced, thus not ongoing all the time, it is also difficult to 
distinguish acts of spoiling from normal violence associated with the conflict (Reiter, 2015). 
By evaluating spoiling behavior after a public agreement has been made on the 
commencement of a peace process, as I do in this thesis, this limitation is partly solved. 
Nonetheless, acts of spoiling often overlap with other violent acts and confirmation of an act 
of spoiling is only possible through data triangulation of mostly secondary sources, such as 
news sites that specifically mention the violent act in reference to the peace process.  
 These limitations have resulted in a small number of spoiling events that can be 
analyzed. However, a small number of spoiling events allow for an in-depth analysis in which 
causal pathways can be identified between these acts of spoiling and the outcome of the 
peace process. These causal pathways provide initial insight in certain trends and are to be 
considered, due to presented limitations, a first necessary step for additional research on 
spoiling behavior and its effects.       
 Lastly, the MPICE Framework used for measuring the DV of interest provides for an 
extensive list of generic indicators for measuring progress in conflict environments. Even 
though guidelines exist that assist in choosing those indicators applicable for the research, the 
MPICE Framework designers recommend full scale courses for policy makers before doing 
so. This is neither feasible nor desirable for the purposes of this thesis, thus chosen indicators 
are based upon generic guidelines that stress the importance of case specifics, hence a peace 
process in which a peace agreement is to be negotiated while implementing the provisions of 
the first preliminary agreement. When moving forward on the findings of this research, this 
given context must be considered.        
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6. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015 
6.1. THE SITUATION IN MALI IN 2012; A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 
ONSET OF THE REBELLION AND THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT 
Mali’s population is diverse and divided. The southern part of Mali, a subtropical area south 
of the Sahelian belt, inhabits eighty-five percent of the population (circa 13 million), mostly 
from two ethnic groups; the Bambara and the Senoufo. The remaining fifteen percent of the 
population (circa 1.5 million) in the desert north of the Sahelian belt, represent the Tuareg, 
Arab or Moor, Songhay and Fulani ethnic groups (See Figure 3 on page 26 and Figure 2 on 
page 27). These groups consist of numerous clans, communities and sub-groups and are 
divided internally along political lines. For example, the town of Kidal, one of the three larger 
cities in northern Mali, has more than sixty Tuareg sub-groups, all with distinct interests and 
agendas (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015).       
 Ever since Mali gained independence in 1960 from France, the Northern Tuareg and 
Arab communities have challenged the authority of Mali’s government, rooting and 
aggravating distrust. Scholars argue that the Malian government together with southern elites 
marginalized and underdeveloped the north over time (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 8; 
Pezard and Shurkin, 2015: 23-44). There have been rebellions in 1963, 1991 and 2006 in 
response to this marginalization. In 2012 the fourth rebellion commenced when Tuareg 
groups, in collaboration with certain Islamist groups, took up arms against the Malian 
government and gained control over all northern cities, including Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. 
Adding to the chaos of the rebellion, one month after its onset, the Malian military forces, 
strongly divided on how the government should deal with the evolving crisis, lost overall 
command and control culminating in a military coup in Mali’s capital, the city of Bamako. 
The military coup ended the Presidency of Amadou Toumani Touré and the conflict 
remained un-answered by the Malian government.      
 It is argued throughout the literature on Mali’s security situation that an understanding 
of the dynamics of northern Mali’s ethnic groups is “crucial to achieving a long-term peace 
agreement and meeting local needs that are currently ignored or fulfilled by others” (Chauzal 
and van Damme, 2015: 34) This complex diversity among northern ethnic groups poses a 
substantial challenge to the peace process. Furthermore, it reflects upon spoiling behavior as 
it coincides with many heterogeneous needs and demands, not always transparent, consistent 
or in harmony with the peace process. In other words, there are many parties who are likely 
to spoil the peace process as it is highly likely not all needs and demands can or will be 
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listened to in due time satisfactory to the spoilers at hand (Hogland and Zartman, 2006; 
Newman and Richmond, 2006).   
FIGURE 3: MAP OF MALI.
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 7. 
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FIGURE 4: ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION.
3
  
  
6.2. KEY PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS 
There are several parties relevant for this research: Parties who are the official signatories of 
the Ouagadougou Accord, parties that have become part of the peace process during 
subsequent peace negotiations and those parties outside of the peace process. Analysis shows 
that all of these parties have engaged in spoiling behavior during the relevant time frame.  
 The governmental signatories to the Ouagadougou Accord are the Malian 
government, the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) and Mali’s interim President 
Dioncounda Traore. After the elections, delayed from April 2012 to July 2013, Ibrahim 
Boubaka Keita was elected President (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).   
 The non-governmental signatories to the Accord are; the National Movement of the 
                                                            
3 Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 35. 
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Liberation of Azawad or the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and 
the High Council for the Unity of Azawad or the Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad 
(HCUA), representative of most Tuareg and some Arab groups. So, despite the extensive 
divisions between and among ethnic groups in northern Mali, the rebel groups responsible for 
the onset of instability in the north, mostly Tuareg groups, collaborated.
4
    
 During the peace process and for a variety of reasons, the MNLA split into several 
factions, yet most of these newly formed groups eventually became, in 2014, a part of the 
coordination of Azawad Movements or the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad 
(CMA); a movement compliant to the peace process and representative of the majority of 
Touareg and some Arab rebels. The CMA consists of the MNLA, the HCUA, the Arab 
Movement of Azawad or the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), a faction of the 
Coordination of the People of Azawad or the Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad (CPA) and 
a splinter group of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Resistance 
(CMFPR). It must be noted that the non-signatories to the Ouagadougou Accord within this 
movement did acknowledge their adherence to the Accord within weeks after the official 
signing in June 2013.          
 The other main non-governmental and compliant movement in the peace process is 
the Platform; a pro-government coalition established as well in 2014 and consisting of the 
Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Resistance (CMFPR), the Tuareg 
Imghad and Allies or the Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Allies (GATIA); a Tuareg 
militia backed by the Malian Army, and splinter groups of the CPA and MAA (Nyirabikali, 
2015). As such, the Platform consists mainly out of Songhay and Fulani groups who oppose 
the Tuareg and have been supported by the Malian government in Bamako during the peace 
process (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 39-41). Additionaly, these groups within the CMA 
and Platform are often referred to as the Compliant Armed Groups (CAGs).  
 Other key parties to the Malian conflict are Islamist Jihadist groups. Some are 
considered Malian extremist armed groups such as Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity 
and Jihad in Western Africa or the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de 
l'Ouest (MUJAO). Others are considered transnational extremist armed groups such as Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQIM) and the Signed in 
Blood Battalion. Ansar Dine was initially an ally of the MNLA, yet split off shortly after the 
onset of the rebellion as they not only pursued self-determination for Azawad, yet were also 
                                                            
4 Azawad is the Tuareg given name to northern Mali 
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dedicated to the establishment of Sharia law throughout the north. Touareg groups within the 
MNLA opposed this goal and their use of terrorist tactics (BBC News, 2013a).  
 At some point during the peace process, with the notable exception of all Islamist 
Jihadist groups, all parties were recognized. Inherent to this recognition are the magnitude of 
diverging claims made against the Malian government increasing the complexity of peace 
negotiations and the resolution of the conflict. Despite the chaotic nature of these divergent 
claims and the challenge it presents to the peace process, the general claim made by all 
Malian rebel groups is that they fight for the rights of Mali’s minority ethnic groups. 
Nonetheless, there is one distinguishing feature between claims made by the CMA and the 
Platform. According to Nyirabikali, the former seeks self-determination, thus greater 
autonomy and the latter seeks to resolve existing political and socio-economic grievances 
(2015).            
 The pursuit for self-determination and greater autonomy is problematic. The Malian 
government suggested that it will make concessions during negotiations, yet has set a “red 
line” in terms of national unity, territorial integrity and secularity. This means that the Malian 
government will not discuss any of these demands (Agence France-Presse, 2014c; United 
Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, SC11726). Even though all signatories and 
compliant groups to the Ouagadougou Accord have agreed to adhere to these “red lines”, 
they still seek to achieve the greatest autonomy possible.      
 The extent to which the peace negotiations reflect this goal is directly related to 
factionalism of armed groups and acts of spoiling. In other words, acts of spoiling have been 
conducted by parties inside the peace process and rebel factions of these parties and/or other 
parties who are outside the peace process. They all seek to gain as much autonomy as 
possible in order to safeguard their competing interests regarding “security in the Sahara, 
organization of the Malian state structure and local balance of power” (ICG, 2014: 1). A 
prevalent interest, for example, is the unfettered access for illicit trafficking in northern Mali.
5
 
And according to reports published by the UN, spoilers will seek to maintain their access for 
illicit trafficking through violence when the road towards peace threatens this interest (United 
Nations Security Council, S/2015/219: 15). It is argued by Colonel MPP Timmermans, the 
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA force between February and December, 
2015, that “pure pragmatism is an important driver of all parties in which they seek the best 
                                                            
5 Stated by N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Forces in Mali between January and 
November 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016. 
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results for their own clan”.6        
 Despite the commitment of certain parties to the peace process, insecurity, instability 
and tensions in northern Mali remained high due to the vast amount of competing interests 
that incentivize parties to spoil the peace process. The more extremist spoiling behavior 
though has mostly been conducted by Islamist Jihadist groups who are considered terrorist 
organizations by the Malian government and the international community. Consequently, 
they are denied a seat at the negotiation table (ICG, 2014:1). Their use of insurgency tactics 
does not always result in a violent act that can be coded as an act of spoiling though as they, 
for example, frequently commit acts against civilians with intended high fatality levels in 
order to induce fear and build on their violent repertoire.
7
 Nonetheless, some of these groups 
have often announced that they want to derail the peace process completely and are unwilling 
to negotiate as long as the “red line” of a secular state remains (Agence France-Presse, 
2014c).           
 In sum of the insights on key parties and their interests provided in previous 
paragraphs, it can be argued in general that there is a deficit of trust between all parties 
involved in the peace process and that communities are very much polarized. Figure 5 on 
page 31 illustrates a simplified typology of all armed groups operating in Mali and Table 1 on 
page 32 schematically figures the key parties of the peace process and their interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Stated by Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA force between 
February and December, 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on April 10, 2016.  
7 Stated by Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Forces in Mali between January and 
November 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016. 
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FIGURE 5: ALL ARMED GROUPS OPERATING IN MALI.
8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/ 
The transnational extremist group Al Murabitun is a faction of MUJAO 
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TABLE 1: KEY PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS 
KEY PARTIES ETHNIC GROUP 
REPRESENTATION 
(MAJORITY) 
SPLIT 
OFF 
FROM 
MAIN INTERESTS IN 
PEACE PROCESS 
INSIDE/OUTSIDE PEACE 
PROCESS 
MALIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
BAMBARA  PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
AND SECULARITY 
INSIDE 
MDSF BAMBARA  AS ABOVE INSIDE 
MNLA TUAREG  PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 
AND SELF 
DETERMINATION OF 
AZAWAD 
INSIDE (CMA) 
HCUA TUAREG  PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 
AND GREATER 
AUTONOMY FOR 
AZAWAD 
AS ABOVE 
MAA ARAB  AS ABOVE AS ABOVE 
MAA FACTION ARAB MAA AS ABOVE INSIDE (PLATFORM) 
CPA  TUAREG  AS ABOVE INSIDE (CMA) 
CPA FACTION TUAREG CPA AS ABOVE INSIDE (PLATFROM) 
CMFPR TUAREG, ARAB, 
FULANI AND 
SONGHAY 
 AS ABOVE AS ABOVE 
CMFPR 
FACTION 
FULANI AND 
SONGHAY 
CMFPR AS ABOVE INSIDE (CMA) 
GATIA TUAREG  AS ABOVE INSIDE (PLATFORM) 
ANSAR DINE TUAREG  SHARIA LAW 
THROUGHOUT MALI 
OUTSIDE 
MUJAO VARIETY OF 
ALGERIAN AND 
SAHARAN ETHNIC 
GROUPS 
AQIM  OUTSIDE 
IMA TUAREG ANSAR 
DINE 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OUTSIDE 
AQIM VARIETY OF 
ALGERIAN AND 
SAHARAN ETHNIC 
GROUPS 
 RETURN TO ISLAM IN 
MALI AND BEYOND 
OUTSIDE 
SIGNED IN 
BLOOD 
BATTALION 
VARIETY OF 
ALGERIAN AND 
SAHARAN ETHNIC 
GROUPS 
AQIM AS ABOVE OUTSIDE 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
(e.g. UN, AU, 
Algeria) 
N/A N/A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
AND SECULARITY 
INSIDE 
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6.3. THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD; THE START OF THE PEACE 
PROCESS 
On June 18, 2013, the Government of Mali and the MNLA and HCUA signed the 
Ouagadougou Accord which is the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and 
inclusive peace talks (Pezard and Shurkin, 2014: 6). This Accord, named after the capital of 
Burkino Faso where the agreement was signed, is the first step of the peace process and 
entails two phases: The first phase addresses the immediate management of the crisis and the 
holding of the Presidential elections in a stable and secure setting. The second phase of the 
Accord is designed to commence after the Presidential elections and entails an immediate 
cease fire, a cantonment of combatants, redeployment of MDSF to the northern regions, a 
return of basic civil services, further prevention of hostilities and inclusive peace negotiations 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2014).        
 A substantial goal of these negotiations is to define the administrative status of 
northern Mali and future development strategies in which national unity and territorial 
integrity is adhered to. Monitoring and enforcement of the Accord’s provisions is ensured by 
the UN, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), who are all signatories to the 
agreement.           
 This summarized description of the provisions in the Accord is relevant to this 
research as it sets forth the objectives of the peace process and explains the chosen indicators 
from the MPICE dataset for the DV of interest; whether or not the peace process progresses. 
As mentioned in paragraph 5.2.1., the peace process progresses when the conflict remains to 
be addressed through a viable peace process and political leaders and elites remain in 
acceptance with and in support of the peace process. And measuring the latter indicator is 
partly done through the number and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by 
faction (Agoglia et al, 2010: 22-23).         
 The cease fire objective of the Ouagadougou Accord is measured through the relative 
number of cases of compliance versus noncompliance. The preferred trend required for the 
DV to be assessed as progressing must be decreasing or negative (Ibid: xvii, 10). The 
redeployment of MDSF to the northern regions of Mali means that they gain control over 
territory. This is measured through the percentage of national territory that is under control of 
the MDSF, hence government. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as 
progressing must be increasing or positive (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 10).     
 The cantonment of combatants objective of the Ouagadougou Accord entails that 
combatants are removed from the conflict zone and restricted in their movements. This is 
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measured through the percentage of national territory controlled by external forces. The 
preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be decreasing or 
negative (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 10). Finally, basic civil services are to return to northern Mali and 
this is measured through the percentage of territory receiving governmental services and 
utilities. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be 
increasing or positive (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 24).       
 The objectives of each phase of the peace process are listed in Table 2 on page 35 and 
Table 3 on page 36 and are divided and converted into the appropriate indicators and 
measures for the DV of interest. The + symbol indicates a preferred trend of increasing or 
positive and the – symbol indicates a preferred trend of decreasing or negative. 
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TABLE 2: OBJECTIVES OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
OBJECTIVES 
PEACE PROCESS 
DV INDICATORS MEASURES PREFERRED 
TREND 
CODE FOR 
PREFERRED 
TREND 
MET / 
CODE FOR 
PREFERRED 
TREND 
NOT MET 
INCLUSIVE PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
IN WHICH THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATUS OF 
NORTHERN MALI 
AND FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES ARE 
DEFINED IN 
ADHERENCE 
WITH THE 
OVERACHING  
GOALS OF 
NATIONAL UNITY, 
TERRITORIAL 
INTEGRITY AND 
SECULARITY 
 
PEACE 
PROCESS 
PROGRESSES 
 
The 
conflict 
remains to 
be 
addressed 
through a 
viable 
peace 
process. 
 
Dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms 
exist in which 
the goal is to 
define the 
administrative 
status of 
northern Mali, 
define future 
development 
strategies and 
to clarify and 
resolve 
remaining vital 
issues among 
parties to the 
conflict. 
 
+ 1-Y / 1-N 
  Political 
leaders 
and elites 
remain in 
acceptance 
with and 
in support 
of the 
peace 
process. 
 
Political 
leaders’ and 
elites’ 
announcement 
to remain 
dedicated to 
the peace 
process and 
their 
renouncement 
and 
condemnation 
of the use of 
violence 
 
 
 
+ 2-Y / 2-N 
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   The number 
and severity of 
violations of 
the 
Ouagadougou 
Accord* 
 
- (this trend 
is as 
depicted 
when the 
preferred 
trends of 
the 
separate 
provision
s of the 
Ouagadou
gou 
Accord 
portrayed 
in Table 3 
are as 
depicted) 
3-Y / 3-N 
(3-Y is 
only met 
through 
the 
following 
equation: 
3A-Y + 3B-
Y + 3C-Y + 
3D-Y)  
 
TABLE 3: PROVISIONS OF THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD (EXCLUDING THE 
OBJECTIVE OF INCLUSIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS) 
MEASURE* PROVISIONS OF 
THE 
OUAGADOUGOU 
ACCORD 
SUB-
INDICATORS 
SUB-MEASURES PREFERRED 
TREND 
CODE FOR 
PREFERRED 
TREND 
MET / 
CODE FOR 
PREFERRED 
TREND 
NOT MET 
NUMBER AND 
SEVERITY OF 
VIOLATIONS OF 
THE 
OUAGADOUGOU 
ACCORD 
CEASE FIRE 
 
 
 
Cases of 
noncompliance 
with cease fire 
agreement are 
resolved 
 
Relative 
number of 
cases of 
compliance 
versus 
noncompliance 
 
 
 
+  
 
 
 
 
 
3A-Y / 
3A-N 
 
 
 
 
REDEPLOYMENT 
OF MDSF TO 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
 
The security 
forces gain and 
maintain 
control over 
national 
territory  
Percentage of 
national 
territory that is 
under control 
of the 
government. 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3B-Y / 
3B-N 
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CANTONMENT 
OF 
COMBATANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Former 
combatants 
and their 
support are 
removed from 
the conflict 
zone and 
restricted in 
their 
movement 
 
The 
percentage of 
national 
territory 
controlled by 
external 
forces. 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3C-Y / 
3C-N 
 BASIC CIVIL 
SERVICES 
RETURNED 
Are the 
various levels 
of government 
capable of 
providing 
essential 
services, 
utilities, and 
functions 
Percentage of 
population or 
percent of 
territory 
receiving 
essential 
government 
services and 
utilities (by 
level of 
government). 
+ 3D-Y / 
3D-N 
        
It is important to note that there are immediate or short term effects and long term effects of 
spoiling behavior that can differ in terms of productivity for the peace process.
9
 In order for 
the peace process to be analyzed as progressing, the preferred trend of the indicators must be 
as depicted in Table 2 and 3. This means that even though certain effects of spoiling behavior 
are unproductive for the peace process in the short term, the overall trend could still be the 
preferred trend. In other words, there could be short term effects of spoiling behavior that are 
unproductive for the peace process while the overall and long term effects of spoiling 
behavior are considered productive for the peace process, hence the trend of indicators are the 
preferred ones. Through the method of process tracing, analysis will illustrate these short and 
long term effects and ultimately allow for an evaluation of the causality between spoiling 
behavior and the outcome of the peace process in terms of the peace process progressing or 
not. 
  
                                                            
9 An effect is considered immediate or short term when observed within days. An effect is considered long 
term when observed within weeks or months. As such, long term is a relative concept applicable to the 
timeframe of interest; 2013-2015. 
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6.4. SPOILING BEHAVIOR; ESTABLISHING CAUSAL PATHWAYS AND 
LOOKING FOR TRENDS   
Before elaborating on acts of spoiling behavior and its effects, it is essential to note a 
complexity of this analysis that has to do with high instability, insecurity and tensions in 
northern Mali during the peace process. First, there were vast intercommunal and armed 
group clashes as many issues were not yet resolved between local communities and/or not yet 
addressed during peace negotiations. And second, criminal activity in northern Mali remained 
high as most people depend on illicit trafficking of goods and/or people in order to earn an 
income and safeguard their livelihood.
10
       
 The root causes for these intercommunal clashes and the necessity for criminal 
activities have to do with the root causes of the overall conflict. According to Chauzal and 
van Damme, these root causes date back to 1960 when Mali gained independence from 
France. These scholars argue that “as soon as Mali gained independence the new government 
had to assert its authority on a large territory, including desert regions where Tuareg and Arab 
communities directly challenged its authority” (2015: 8). The Malian government regarded 
the northern populations inadequate and marginalized them over time. Additionally, they 
favored certain groups over others and used counterinsurgency methods to divide the 
northern population and prevent them from gaining significant power. As a result, “the direct 
and long term consequences of this strategy were deep animosity between northern 
populations, fierce resentment by communities towards the central state and a very 
heterogeneous distribution of needs and demands” (Ibid).      
 For the purpose of this research, these insights mean that the ongoing intercommunal 
clashes, the high degree of fragmentation of key parties to the peace process and enduring 
criminal activity increases overall instability, insecurity and tensions in northern Mali which 
most likely negatively affect the peace process (Steenkamp, 2009: 1-2). Even though these 
violent acts are not the focus of this thesis, it is essential to consider acts of spoiling in this 
broader context. So, when analysis shows that spoiling behavior adds to overall instability, 
insecurity and tensions, it is expected that the peace process will be affected negatively.  
 However, the short and long term effects of spoiling behavior can differ in terms of 
productivity for the peace process. For example, analysis will show that acts of spoiling 
directly challenge the ability of the Malian government, its armed forces and the international 
community to implement provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord as overall insecurity and 
                                                            
10 As stated by N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch forces in Mali from January to November, 
2015, in an interview conducted with the author on 27 May, 2016.  
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instability is increased. This is mostly unproductive for the peace process in the short term as 
progress is hindered.           
 Nonetheless, the implementation of provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou Accord 
is only part of the main interest of this analysis; whether or not the peace process progresses 
in terms of peace negotiations that remain ongoing and actors who remain dedicated towards 
the peace process. So, even though a critical analysis of the short term effects of spoiling 
behavior is vital to this research, the upcoming analysis is based upon a broader critical 
assessment of these short term effects and its causality, if any at all, with peace negotiations 
in the long term. 
6.4.1. SPOILING EVENTS; ANALYZING THE EFFECTS 
Between the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord in June, 2013 and the signing of the 
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali in June, 2015, seven acts of spoiling are 
derived in accordance with the operationalization criteria listed in paragraph 5.2.2. These 
spoiling events, in some cases multiple acts of spoiling that are considered as one event, are 
listed in Table 4 on pages 39 through 43 and given a code; A through G. In 2013, a suicide 
bombing took place in Timbuktu (spoiling event D) and a grenade attack in Kidal (spoiling 
event E). In 2014, five Red Cross employees and a MNLA senior political representative 
were abducted (spoiling event A and B), there were hostilities between the MNLA and 
MDSF (spoiling event C) and armed clashes between the MNLA, MAA and its factions 
(spoiling event F). Lastly, in 2015, all CAG’s clashed with one and another (spoiling event 
G).            
 Analyses of these spoiling events are depicted through three themes: Spoiling and 
Terrorism, from spoiling events A and B. Spoiling and Discontent from spoiling events C, D 
and E. And Spoiling and Factionalism from spoiling events F and G. Furthermore, Tables 5 
and 6 for spoiling event A and B, Tables 7 and 8 for spoiling event C, D and E and Table 9 
for spoiling event G on the following pages illustrate the causal pathways between these 
spoiling events and the outcome of the peace process through the trend codes depicted in 
Tables 2 and 3 on pages 35 and 36. These themes simplify the complexity of the analysis 
rendered in Tables 5 through 10 and therefore aid in summarizing findings and drawing 
conclusions.  
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TABLE 4: SPOILING EVENTS 
SPOILING EVENT DATE  KEY PARTY 
RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES 
 
CODE REFERENCE 
TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
ABDUCTION OF 5 
RED CROSS 
EMPLOYEES 
BETWEEN 
KIDAL AND GAO 
8 FEB 
2014 
MUJAO 
 
ACLED 
event no: 
814MLI / 
49912. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 
6. The 
Guardian, 
2014. 
A Terrorist 
organizations 
seek to induce 
fear, decrease 
stability and 
increase 
tensions in 
order to 
undermine the 
peace process 
as the peace 
process hinders 
their goal of 
establishing 
Sharia law in 
Mali (BBC 
NEWS, 2013; 
START, 
2015).
11
 
 
 
 
ABDUCTION OF 
MNLA SENIOR 
POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
IN TESSALIT WHO 
REPORTEDLY 
DIED OF ILLNESS 
ONE DAY LATER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
January 
2014 
ANSAR DINE 
/ AQIM 
ACLED 
event no: 
799MLI / 
49896. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
B See above. 
Also: ANSAR 
DINE has 
specifically 
declared war at 
MNLA for 
working with 
the 
international 
community, 
referred to as 
“crusaders” by 
Ansar Dine 
members, and 
being part of 
the peace 
process (Weiss, 
2016).  
 
                                                            
11 Data confirmed through interviews with Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Forces 
between January and November 2015 and Colonel. MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the 
MINUSMA force between February and December, 2015 conducted by the author in May, 2016. 
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SPOILING EVENT DATE  KEY PARTY 
RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES 
 
CODE REFERENCE 
TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
HOSTILITIES 
BETWEEN MDSF 
AND MNLA IN 
THE KIDAL 
REGION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16-21 
May, 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MDSF and 
MNLA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACLED 
event no: 
868MLI / 
49965. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
ACLED 
event no: 
869MLI / 
49966. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
ACLED 
event no: 
871MLI / 
49968. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discontent of 
both parties in 
terms of the 
slow 
implementation 
of the 
provisions of 
the 
Ouagadougou 
Accord (United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/403: 3). 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING IN 
TIMBUKTU 
KILLING AND 
WOUNDING 
MALIAN 
SOLDIERS 
(MDSF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Sep, 
2013 
 
AQIM 
 
ACLED 
event no: 
743MLI / 
49840. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
BBC 
NEWS, 
2013b. 
Agence  
France 
Presse, 
2013b. 
D MNLA and 
HCUA 
withdrew from 
the Monitoring 
and Eval. 
Committee 
(concerned with 
the 
implementation 
of the Ouagad. 
Acc.) and the 
peace process 
came to a halt. 
AQIM took 
advantage of the 
situation to incr. 
tensions (UN 
Security Council, 
S/2014/1; Al 
Jazeera, 2013).12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Forces between January and November 2015,  
states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that the terrorist organizations in Mali always 
sought opportunities in which they could increase further tensions, fear and instability in order to undermine 
the peace process. In many occasions, a halt in the peace process was such an opportunity. 
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SPOILING EVENT DATE  KEY PARTY 
RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES 
 
CODE REFERENCE 
TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
GRENADE 
ATTACK ON 
MDSF IN KIDAL 
 
29 Sep, 
2013 
MNLA ACLED 
event no: 
744MLI / 
49842. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
Agence 
France 
Presse, 
2013b; 
BBC 
NEWS, 
2013b. 
E Due to the 
withdrawal of 
MNLA and 
HCUA from 
the Monitoring 
and Evaluating 
Committee that 
is concerned 
with the 
implementation 
of the 
Ouagadougou 
Accord 
provisions, the 
peace process 
came to a halt. 
Fighting 
renewed as 
parties inside 
of the peace 
process were 
dissatisfied 
with the 
progress made 
so far during 
peace 
negotiations 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/1; 
Agence France 
Presse, 2013b; 
Agence France 
Presse, 2013a). 
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SPOILING EVENT DATE  KEY PARTY 
RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES 
 
CODE REFERENCE 
TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
ARMED 
CLASHES 
BETWEEN THE 
MNLA, MAA AND 
IT FACTIONS 
THROUGHOUT 
THE NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
11 – 27 
July, 
2014 
MNLA / MAA ACLED 
event no: 
901MLI / 
49998. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
ACLED 
event no: 
902MLI / 
49999. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
ACLED 
event no: 
909MLI / 
50006. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
ACLED 
event no: 
911MLI / 
50007. 
(Raleigh et 
al, 2010). 
United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/692: 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F The newly 
formed armed 
groups all 
sought to 
become a key 
player in peace 
negotiations in 
which they are 
able to bring 
additional 
players’ 
interests to the 
negotiating 
table (United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/692: 2).  
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SPOILING EVENT DATE  KEY PARTY 
RESPONSIBLE 
SOURCES 
 
CODE REFERENCE 
TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
ARMED 
CLASHES 
BETWEEN AND 
ATTACKS BY 
ALL COMPLIANT 
ARMED GROUPS 
THROUGHOUT 
THE NORTHERN 
REGIONS, MOST 
NOTABLY IN 
TIMBUKTU AND 
MENACA 
 
April 
and 
May, 
2015 
CAG’s ACLED event 
no: 1035MLI 
/ 50132. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1036MLI 
/ 50133. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1037MLI 
/ 50135. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1039MLI 
/ 50136. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1041MLI 
/ 50138. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1045MLI 
/ 50142. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). 
ACLED event 
no: 1047MLI 
/ 50144. 
(Raleigh et al, 
2010). United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2015/426: 
4.  
G The frequency 
of attacks and 
clashes 
increased 
leading up to 
the ceremony 
for the signing 
of the peace 
agreement. All 
CAG’s were 
seeking to 
assert influence 
and make 
territorial and 
political gains. 
Furthermore, 
internal 
divisions arose 
amongst the 
CAG’s in 
response to the 
proposed peace 
agreement. 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2015/426: 4).  
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6.4.1.1. SPOILING AND TERRORISM   
During the first months of 2014, parties inside the peace process, in particular the MNLA, 
increasingly fragmented during exploratory discussions and workshops aimed at establishing 
a roadmap for future negotiations between the Malian government and other armed groups. 
Divisions occurred as parties were “unable to overcome disagreements on the interpretation 
of the preliminary agreement and the inclusion of the adherent groups, MAA and CMPFR, in 
the process” (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6).13 For example, the former 
head of MNLA’s external relations section, seeking to be included in negotiations 
representing different interests, split from the MNLA and launched a new movement, the 
CPA (Jeune Afrique, 2014).         
 Amidst the fragmentation of armed groups and the ongoing workgroups between 
them, AQIM abducted five Red Cross employees (Spoiling event A). Furthermore, Ansar 
Dine abducted a MNLA senior political representative who later reportedly died of illness 
(Spoiling event B). The primary motive of these known terrorist groups was to induce fear 
and fuel further the tensions resulting from disagreements amongst and between parties in 
order to undermine the peace process and hinder peacebuilding operations.  
 Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the causal pathways derived from data analysis which 
subsequently will be elaborated on in the text.      
    
  
                                                            
13 The Ouagadougou Accord is within the literature and in open sources often referred to as the preliminary 
agreement as it represents the first step towards a comprehensive peace agreement, thus the start of the 
peace process and the road towards inclusionary peace negotiations. 
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TABLE 5: SPOILING EVENT A 
S
P
O
IL
IN
G
 C
O
D
E
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
 
 E
F
F
E
C
T
 
 E
F
F
E
C
T
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
 
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
 A
S
 
P
E
R
 C
O
D
E
S
 
T
A
B
L
E
 2
 A
N
D
 3
 
 P
R
O
D
U
C
T
IV
E
 
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
: Y
E
S
 / 
N
O
 
A RED CROSS 
SUSPENDS 
OPERATIONS 
IN RURAL 
AREAS OF 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
(International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross, 
2014a). 
DETERIORATION 
OF HUMAN 
WELL-BEING IN 
RURAL AREAS 
OF NORTHERN 
REGIONS AS 
WATER SUPPLY 
AND OTHER AID 
WAS 
SUSPENDED 
(International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross, 2014a). 
  3D-N NO 
DETERIORATION 
OVERALL 
SECURITY 
SITUATION IN 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 4) 
TRANSPORTATION 
ROUTES 
INSECURE 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6) 
LACK OF 
RESOUR-
CES (United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 
6) 
 3-N NO 
 RE-
ESTABLISH-
MENT OF 
STATE 
AUTHORITY 
HINDERED. 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 
6) 
 3D-N NO 
NO 
MEETINGS 
COULD 
TAKE 
PLACE ON 
CANTONMENT 
PROGRESS 
(Human 
Rights 
Watch, 2014: 
6). 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTONMENT 
OF 
COMBATANTS 
HINDERED 
(Human Rights 
Watch, 2014: 6). 
3C-N NO 
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INCREASE 
IN 
MINUSMA 
PATROLS 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 
6-12) 
DECREASE IN 
HINDERED 
OPERATIONS IN 
TERMS OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PROVISIONS 
SET FORTH IN THE 
OUAGADOUGOU 
ACCORD.14 
UNCLEAR 
 
Even though 
data 
suggests 3-
Y, no 
specific 
sources are 
available 
verifying the 
indicators 
and 
measures of 
interest. 
UNCLEAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DISCLOSURE 
OF 
INFORMATION 
ON ACTOR’S 
MILITARY 
STRENGTH 
AND 
CAPABILITIES  
AN INCREASE IN 
REQUESTS 
MADE BY 
MINUSMA 
TOWARDS THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
FOR AN 
INCREASE IN 
RESOURCES 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6-12) 
  UNCLEAR 
 
As the 
MINUSMA 
mission 
was not yet 
operating 
at 100%, it 
is not clear 
whether or 
not an 
increase in 
resources 
occurred 
on top of 
the 
resources 
agreed 
upon in the 
original 
mission 
mandate. 
UNCLEAR 
    
  
 
  
                                                            
14 Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and 
November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that a boost in MINUSMA 
presence in violent prone areas, in most cases resulted in a return to normalcy in which the implementation of 
provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord could move forward. 
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TABLE 6: SPOILING EVENT B 
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B INCREASE IN 
CLASHES 
BETWEEN 
MNLA AND 
ANSAR DINE 
AND OTHER 
TERRORIST 
ORGANIZA-
TIONS (United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 3-5; 
ACLED event no. 
811MLI / 49908; 
ACLED event no. 
816MLI / 49913) 
 
INCREASE IN 
FRAGMENTA-
TION OF MNLA 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 4) 
UNCLEAR  UNCLEAR UN-
CLEAR 
DETERIORATION 
OVERALL 
SECURITY 
SITUATION IN 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS (United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 4) 
LACK OF 
RESOURCES 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6) 
 3-N NO 
 RE-
ESTABLISH-
MENT OF 
STATE 
AUTHORITY 
HINDERED. 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6) 
 3D-N NO 
INCREASE IN 
MINUSMA 
PATROLS 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6-
12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECREASE IN 
HINDERED 
OPERATIONS IN 
TERMS OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PROVISIONS 
SET FORTH IN 
THE 
OUAGADOUGOU 
ACCORD15 
UNCLEAR 
 
Even 
though 
data 
suggests 3-
Y, no 
specific 
sources are 
available 
verifying 
the 
indicators 
and 
measures 
of interest 
 
 
UN-
CLEAR 
                                                            
15 Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and 
November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that a boost in MINUSMA 
presence in violent prone areas, in most cases resulted in a return to normalcy in which the implementation of 
provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord could move forward. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
49 
 
AN INCREASE 
IN REQUESTS 
MADE BY 
MINUSMA 
TOWARDS THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
FOR AN 
INCREASE IN 
RESOURCES 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6-
12) 
 UNCLEAR 
 
As the 
MINUSMA 
mission 
was not 
yet 
operating 
at 100%, 
it is not 
clear 
whether 
or not an 
increase 
in 
resources 
occurred 
on top of 
the 
resources 
agreed 
upon in 
the 
original 
mission 
mandate. 
UN-
CLEAR 
   MINUSMA 
MISSION 
MANDATE 
RENEWAL 
WHICH 
ALLOWS FOR 
AN INCREASE 
IN MINUSMA 
PRESENCE IN 
THE NORTH 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/403: 15-
19) 
A GREATER 
CONCENTRATION 
OF MINUSMA 
PERSONNEL 
WAS DEPLOYED 
TO THE 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS (United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2014/403) 
UNCLEAR UN-
CLEAR 
 DISCLOSURE 
OF 
INFORMATION 
ON ACTOR’S 
MILITARY 
STRENGTH 
AND 
CAPABILITIES 
AN INCREASE 
IN REQUESTS 
MADE BY 
MINUSMA 
TOWARDS THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
FOR AN 
INCREASE IN 
RESOURCES 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6-12) 
MINUSMA 
MISSION 
MANDATE 
RENEWAL 
WHICH 
ALLOWS FOR 
AN INCREASE 
IN MINUSMA 
PRESENCE IN 
THE NORTH 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/403: 15-
19) 
A GREATER 
CONCENTRATION 
OF MINUSMA 
PERSONNEL 
WAS DEPLOYED 
TO THE 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS (United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2014/403) 
UNCLEAR UN-
CLEAR 
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SPOILING AND TERRORISM: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES 
It can be argued that these spoiling events have not disclosed new information on terrorist 
groups’ motives to hinder peacebuilding operations. It has however disclosed information on 
their strong fighting capabilities. Official UN reports and other sources argue that these actors 
are hard to beat militarily (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229; United Nations 
Security Council, S/2014/403; United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692; The Atlantic, 
2013; Pezard and Shurkin, 2015). Information on actors’ military strength is often uncertain 
and these acts of spoiling disclosed information on their capabilities and persistence. 
Consequently and in line with the literature on spoiling, these terrorist groups should be 
considered relevant to the peace process as they have the ability to undermine and derail the 
peace process.           
 In terms of the proposed hypotheses, these actors should be included in negotiations 
when willing to negotiate or they should be weakened and eliminated as a threat when 
unwilling to negotiate (as per IVV2C1 and 2C2). Be that as it may, the Malian peace process 
cannot or has difficulties in accommodating these actors. First of all, regardless of these 
terrorist groups’ willingness to negotiate, they are blacklisted in the peace process, thus 
excluded from all peace negotiations. Additionally, their demands and interests are mostly 
concerned with establishing a place for Islam in politics, hence are directly in opposition with 
the principles of the peace process and the “red line” of a secular state set forth by the Malian 
government (Agence France-Presse, 2014c). As such, their interests are unrealizable, thus 
irrelevant.           
 The disclosure of information on these actors’ strength and military capabilities, 
whether or not they can be included in the peace process, should alarm peace makers that 
these actors need to be weakened and eliminated as being a threat to the peace process. Or, 
they need to become engaged in the peace process based upon realizable interests. For the 
purposes of this research, these findings mean that despite the disclosure on information on 
these actors’ military strength and capability, these acts of spoiling cannot confirm or 
disconfirm the proposed hypotheses. Nonetheless, analysis shows in Table 5 and 6 there are 
alternative causal pathways and trends that need to be considered that mostly have to do with 
the implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement.     
SPOILING AND TERRORISM: TRENDS  
The main short term effect of spoiling events A and B is perpetrating a climate of fear and 
increasing tensions throughout northern Mali. There have not only been abductions and 
assassinations directly connected to the peace process, but also a vast amount of other violent 
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acts without a clear reference to the peace process. These mostly terrorist acts include 
ambushes with improvised explosive devices (IED’s) and suicide bombings killing many 
civilians, government officials, armed rebels and international peace enforcers and/or keepers 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014).        
 From existing data and expert knowledge it has become clear that the increase in fear 
and tensions resulting from these acts of spoiling and terror affect the progress of the peace 
process in terms of the implementation of provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord. 
As stated by Colonel Timmermans, “implementation cannot come up to speed due to terrorist 
activity”.16 For example, there was no progress on the cantonment and disarmament of armed 
groups as disagreement and tensions between and amongst responsible parties obstructed 
necessary meetings to take place that address the cantonment procedures (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014: 6). Furthermore, humanitarian assistance is hampered due to security concerns 
as well as the re-deployment of representatives of the judiciary, as part of the provision 
concerned with the return of basic civil services to the northern regions (United Nations 
Security Council, S/2014/692: 6).        
 Through analysis it has become evident that these acts of spoiling, accompanied by 
and similar to the vast amount of terrorist attacks, are highly likely to exacerbate an already 
precarious and challenging peace process which in general cannot be considered productive 
for the peace process, at least not in the short term. The trend for the implementation of 
provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord, such as the cantonment of combatants, the 
redeployment of MDSF and the return of basic civil services is not the preferred trend for the 
peace process to be assessed as progressing.        
 On the other hand though, it is interesting to note that despite these acts of spoiling 
and terror and the lack of progress within the peace process in terms of the implementation of 
provisions of the preliminary agreement, the workgroups and exploratory discussions 
between warring parties continued and recommendations were made for future inclusive 
peace talks, including confidence-building measures, cantonment plans and the return of 
basic civil services (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 17). As such, the preferred 
trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing is met through the ongoing dispute 
resolution mechanisms and the announcement of key parties that they remain dedicated to the 
peace process. This finding however is unrelated to spoiling events A and B and therefore 
cannot confirm or disconfirm the proposed hypotheses.   
                                                            
16 Interview of Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA Force between 
February and December 2015, conducted by author on April 10, 2016. 
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SPOILING AND TERRORISM: OTHER EFFECTS AND CAUSAL PATHWAYS 
Other, more long term, effects of these acts of spoiling behavior are also visible. One of the 
main effects of the disclosure of information on the terrorist groups’ military strength and 
capabilities entails the appeal of the international community for more MINUSMA troops 
and key force enablers (United Nations Security Council, S/2013/582; Keesing’s Record of 
World Events, 2013). As such, it can be argued that spoiling behavior has resulted in an 
increase in international resources, which in turn is considered necessary to achieve the 
following objective: “Armed opposition groups responsible for political violence have largely 
been defeated, subordinated to legitimate government authority, or disarmed and reintegrated 
into society. National security forces, increasingly operating lawfully under legitimate 
government authority, provide a safe and secure environment for citizens, assisted by a 
sustainable level of involvement by international forces” (Agoglia et al, 2010: 1).17 So, from 
this analysis a new hypothesis and new causal pathways arise that has to do with third party 
involvement which will be elaborated on in the final part of this chapter.   
6.4.1.2. SPOILING AND DISCONTENT    
There are three significant events in the peace process that have to do with acts of spoiling 
behavior and armed groups’ discontent in terms of the implementation of the provisions set 
forth by the Ouagadougou Accord (Spoiling events C, D and E as portrayed in Tables 7 and 
8).            
 First two spoiling events (D and E) have to do with the withdrawal of the MNLA and 
HCUA from the Monitoring and Evaluating Committee that is concerned with the 
implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions in September, 2013 (United Nations 
Security Council, S/2014/1: 1). A joint statement was made explaining their decision to 
withdraw: “Following multiple difficulties in implementing the Ouagadougou Accord, caused 
notably by the Mali government’s failure to respect its commitments, the CMA parties decide 
to suspend participation in the structures created by the Accord” (Agence-France-Press, 
2013b). As a result of this announcement and the halt in the peace process, fighting renewed 
between all parties involved and acts of spoiling occurred, such as a suicide bombing in 
Timbuktu (Spoiling event D) and a grenade attack in Kidal (Spoiling event E) in which the 
                                                            
17 The United States Institute of Peace has designed the MPICE dataset for policymakers, analysts, planners, and 
program and project implementers in order to measure progress in conflict areas around the world. The primary objective 
of the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE, pronounced M-Peace) project is to provide a comprehensive 
capability for measuring progress during stabilization and reconstruction operations for subsequent integrated interagency 
and intergovernmental use. As such, MPICE data is inherently linked to third party involvement in conflict areas and an 
increase in third party resources should therefore increase their ability to achieve the objectives and measure progress 
accordingly. 
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rebels responsible expressed their dissatisfaction with the peace process (Ibid).   
 The second significant event in the peace process that has to do with armed groups’ 
discontent in terms of the implementation of the provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou 
Accord occurred between 16 and 21 May, 2014 in the city of Kidal. Substantial spoiling acts 
occurred when hostilities broke out between the signatories of the Ouagadougou Accord, 
namely the MDSF and the MNLA. The latter group had expressed concern prior to the clash 
about the “slow pace of implementation of the preliminary agreement” (United Nations 
Security Council, S/2014/403: 3). Furthermore, both parties accused each other of hindering 
the implementation of provisions.         
 Tables 7 and 8 render the causal pathways derived from data analysis which 
subsequently will be elaborated on in the text.      
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TABLE 7: SPOILING EVENT C 
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C DISCLO-
SURE OF 
INFORMA-
TION ON 
MNLA’S 
MILITARY 
STRENGTH 
AND 
CAPABILI-
TIES (ICG, 
2014: 3; 
Agence 
France 
Presse, 
2014b) 
BALANCE OF 
POWER CHANGED 
IN FAVOR OF 
MNLA (ICG, 2014: 3; 
Agence France Presse, 
2014b) 
RENEWED 
DIALOGUE IN 
WHICH 
CERTAIN 
PROVISIONS OF 
THE 
PRELIMINARY 
ACCORD WERE 
ALTERED IN 
ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE 
DEMANDS SET 
FORTH BY THE 
MNLA AND A 
NEW CEASE 
FIRE 
AGREEMENT 
WAS SIGNED 
(Agence France 
Presse, 2014a; 
ACLED event no. 
877MLI / 49974). 
IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF 
THE 
OUAGADOUGO
U ACCORD 
GAINED BACK 
MOMENTUM 
(United Nations 
Meetings 
Coverage and 
Press Releases, 
2014). 
1-Y / 2-Y 
 
No data is 
available 
that 
verifies 3A 
through 
3D. 
YES 
 HINDERING 
OF 
OPERATIONS 
BY 
PEACEKE
E-PERS 
AND 
MDSF 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/692: 
5). 
ARMED GROUPS 
CONTROL OF 
TERRITORY IN 
STALEMATE IN 
SOME AREAS AND 
INCREASED IN 
AGUELHOK, 
ANEFIS, ANSONGO, 
LERE, TESSALIT 
AND 
ANDERAMBOUKAN
E (United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 5; ACLED 
event no. 880MLI / 
49977; ACLED event 
no. 881MLI / 49978; 
ACLED event no. 
882MLI / 49979; 
ACLED event no. 
883MLI / 49980; 
ACLED event no. 
884MLI / 49981). 
 
 
 
  3B-N / 3C-
N 
NO 
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  PROGRESSIVE 
DEPLOYMENT 
OF MDSF IN 
KIDAL REGION 
DERAILED 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 5).  
RE-
ESTABLISHMEN
T OF STATE 
AUTHORITY 
HINDERED. 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/229: 6) 
 3B-N NO 
  ACCESS TO 
BASIC SOCIAL 
SERVICES 
DECREASED AS 
SEVEN 
SCHOOLS WERE 
FORCED TO 
CLOSE (United 
Nations Security 
Council, S/2014/692: 
5). 
STUDENTS 
COULD NOT 
COMPLETE 
THE 
ACADEMIC 
CURRICULUM 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 5). 
 
 3D-N NO 
  MORE 
CIVILIANS 
BECAME 
DISPLACED 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 5). 
INCREASE IN 
HUMAN 
SUFFERING 
(International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross, 2014b) 
 UN-
CLEAR 
(in terms 
of 
proposed 
hypothe-
ses) 
NO 
  RE-GROUPING 
OF OTHER 
SMALLER 
ARMED 
GROUPS SUCH 
AS THE CMPFR 
AND MAA 
 (United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 6).  
GAIN 
LEVERAGE 
IN PEACE 
PROCESS 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/692: 6). 
 UN-
CLEAR 
(no data 
can be 
verified on 
altered 
peace 
negotiation
s in favor 
of these 
groups) 
UN-
CLEA
R 
  INCREASE IN 
ACTIVITIES OF 
TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS.
18 
DETERIORA-
TION OVERALL 
SECURITY 
SITUATION IN 
NORTHERN 
REGIONS (United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2014/229: 4) 
 3-N 
 
As per the 
traced 
process of 
spoiling 
act A and 
B 
NO 
 
                                                            
18 Colonel N. Woudstra; Contingents commandant of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and 
November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that this spoiling event 
resulted in an overall deterioration of security in Kidal, most notably through the increase in activities of 
terrorist organization. 
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TABLE 8: SPOILING EVENTS D AND E 
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D + 
E 
DISCLOSURE 
OF 
INFORMA-
TION ON 
RELEVANT 
INTERESTS 
SUCH AS 
THE DEGREE 
OF AUTONO-
MY FOR 
AZAWAD 
(Agence-
France-Presse, 
2013c).   
NON-
OFFICIAL 
CLARIFY-
ING 
TALKS 
WERE 
HELD 
BETWEEN 
THE 
ARMED 
GROUPS 
AND THE 
MEDIATOR 
(Agence-
France-
Presse, 
2013c).    
RENEWED 
DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN 
PARTIES 
INVOLVED 
BASED UPON 
RELEVANT 
INTERESTS 
DISCLOSED AND 
RENEWED 
COMMITMENT 
OF THE MALIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
TO IMPLEMENT 
MEASURES 
NECESSARY 
FOR ACHIEVING 
INCLUSIVE AND 
GENUINE 
DECENTRALIZATION 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/1: 2). 
  
WORK OF 
THE 
MONITORING 
AND 
EVALUATION 
COMMITTEE 
RESUMED 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/1: 2). 
1-Y / 2-Y  
 
Due to a lack of 
data, it remains 
unclear what 
effect the  
resumed work 
of the 
Monitoring 
and Evaluation 
Committee had 
on the 
implementation 
of the 
Ouagadougou 
Accord 
provisions)  
YES 
  RELEASE OF 11 
MNLA AND 
HCUA 
PRISONERS IN 
RETURN FOR 
CONTROL OVER 
A 
GOVERNORATE 
BUILDING AND 
RADIO STATION 
SEIZED DURING 
RENEWED 
FIGHTING 
(United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2014/1: 2). 
 UNCLEAR UNCLEAR 
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SPOILING AND DISCONTENT: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES 
It is argued that spoiling event D clarified information on certain interests relevant to the 
peace process (Agence-France-Presse, 2013b).  These interests mostly have to do with how 
much autonomy the rebel groups are to gain from the Malian government for Azawad during 
peace talks. According to the rebels themselves, “the decision to temporarily suspend our 
participation allowed us to hold an internal dialogue among our movements and have fruitful 
clarifying exchanges with the mediator” (Ibid). This statement was released after they 
decided to resume peace talks several days later.     
 Even though the Malian government would not discuss any demands that affect 
territorial integrity, they expressed their commitment to “implement the measures necessary 
for achieving inclusive and genuine decentralization” (United Nations Security Council, 
S/2014/1: 2). Furthermore, as a confidence building measure the Malian government released 
11 MNLA and HCUA prisoners in return for control over a governorate building and radio 
station that were seized after renewed fighting broke out (Ibid).     
 In sum, these acts of spoiling disclosed information on new and relevant interests to 
the peace process. First it became evident the Malian government would not give in to any 
demands that would affect territorial integrity and the rebel groups were able to clarify their 
interests in light of this information. Peace negotiations resumed after including these 
interests as did the work of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee by all key parties. The 
preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing were met through the 
ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms after the disclosure of information and the 
announcement of key parties to remain dedicated to the peace process. Nonetheless, even 
though a working Monitoring and Evaluation Committee was necessary for the 
implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord to continue, it is unclear from 
available data whether or not the implementation progressed as a result of the re-installment 
of the Committee. As such, these acts of spoiling only confirm the proposed hypothesis in 
terms of ongoing peace negotiations between all parties involved.   
 When analyzing spoiling event C, it can be argued that political armed groups’ defeat 
of the Malian Army relaunched the peace process by changing the balance of power between 
the government and the armed groups (ICG, 2014: 3; Agence France Presse, 2014b). As such, 
information was disclosed on the military strength and capabilities of the MNLA and 
affiliated armed groups. These groups’ relevance increased and made clear to the Malian 
government that their position had become vulnerable and that dialogue needed to be 
renewed. Subsequently, peace negotiations, mediated by Algiers, resumed and certain 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
58 
 
preconditions of the preliminary agreement were altered in accordance with the interests of 
the MNLA and affiliated armed groups. For example, among their demands were the release 
of prisoners, better conditions for refugees after the signage of a peace agreement and more 
inclusionary negotiations (Agence France Presse, 2014b). Furthermore, one of the main 
stipulations of the Ouagadougou Accord is the existence of cantonment sites for the armed 
groups as a precondition for dialogue (Ouagadougou Accord, 13 June 2013). This became to 
be an issue of interest instead of a precondition for dialogue, opening up room for other 
armed groups to engage in negotiations while preserving their military strength.  
 In this case, spoiling behavior disclosed information on relevant actors’ military 
strength and capabilities. This information had been private or uncertain before and after 
disclosure the information was assessed as relevant for the peace process. In other words, the 
relevance of certain actors’ interests became clear as the balance of power had changed. 
Shortly thereafter, a new cease-fire agreement was struck, peace negotiations gained back 
momentum and all actors reiterated their dedication to the peace process, the cease-fire 
agreement and the implementation of provisions set forth in the preliminary and subsequent 
agreements.            
 The preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing were met 
through the ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the announcement of key parties to 
remain dedicated to the peace process. Furthermore, a new cease-fire agreement was struck, 
thus the disclosure of information on relevant actors’ military strength and interests 
ultimately resulted in a bargain to be struck which is in line with the theoretical framework of 
bargaining theory. As such, the causal pathways between spoiling event C and the outcome of 
the peace process confirm the proposed hypotheses, at least in terms of the peace process 
remaining viable and the support and acceptance of the peace process by the key parties 
involved.             
 It is of interest to mention that these spoiling events were conducted by those parties 
inside the peace process and that they were motivated to spoil by the slow implementation of 
the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord and a stalemate in peace negotiations. It is 
expected then that after the revival of peace negotiations, the implementation of provisions 
will start to progress as well, adding to the overall assessment of the preferred trend for a 
peace process progressing. In order to analyze this claim it is necessary to examine in detail 
overall trends in regard of other short and long term effects of these spoiling events. 
   
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
59 
 
SPOILING AND DISCONTENT: TRENDS 
The other, mostly short term effects, of these spoiling events are as fivefold. First there was a 
hindering of operations within the pre-cantonment sites resulting in the armed groups’ control 
of territory to be in a stalemate. So, the preferred trend of a decrease in control of territory by 
armed groups was not met. Second, the progressive deployment of the MDSF in the Kidal 
region was derailed by the increase in violence, hence increase in insecurity and instability 
(United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5). Third, the access to basic social services in 
the Kidal area decreased as seven schools were forced to close preventing hundreds of 
children from finishing the academic year and more civilians became displaced instead of 
being able to return to their homes (Ibid: 6). Even though these latter indicators are not 
directly relevant for this analysis, they are generic indicators of negative progress, as 
proposed by the MPICE Framework (Agoglia et. al., 2010)     
 The two remaining effects to be observed from the political armed groups’ defeat 
after spoiling event C include the ability of other smaller armed groups, such as the CMPFR 
and MAA, to re-group and recruit in the hope to become included in future disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration processes. In other words, the opportunity arisen from the 
changed balance of power allowed them to increase strength and gain leverage in the peace 
process as a means to secure the dividends of the peace process (United Nations Security 
Council, S/2014/692: 6). Furthermore, the large scale resumption of hostilities gave way to an 
increase of activities of extremist terrorist groups which resulted in increased tensions, fear 
and distrust as per findings illustrated in paragraph 6.4.1.1. Spoiling and Terrorism. So, what 
trend is there to be observed taking into account these five effects of spoiling behavior?  
 In terms of the cantonment of combatants’ provision of the Ouagadougou Accord, the 
armed groups’ control of territory did not decrease. Even though it is not clear from available 
data whether or not the control of territory by armed groups increased as a result of these 
spoiling events, it is clear that in the short term no progress was made. All of these effects, 
that mostly have to do with a delayed implementation of provisions of the preliminary 
agreement, are argued to be short term effects. As such, it is expected that as soon as 
hostilities end and dialogue continues, the implementation of provisions should resume. 
Analysis shows that this indeed was the case. Within days of the hostilities in the Kidal 
region, a ceasefire agreement was signed and within a few weeks several agreements on a 
cessation of hostilities between other groups in other regions, namely the Gao and Timbuktu 
region, were signed. These agreements entail ending the attempts to occupy new positions, a 
general consensus on the cessation of hostilities and a renewed commitment to the peace 
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process. Consequently, implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions has 
supposedly resumed (United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2014). 
Ultimately it can be argued that all parties were reminded of the costs of fighting, 
incentivizing them to recommit towards the road to peace. There is however no data available 
confirming this claim. As such, the preferred trends for a peace process to be assessed as 
progressing cannot be verified.  
6.4.1.3. SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM 
From 14 to 24 July, 2014, after months of informal meetings, the formal peace negotiations 
commenced as called for by the preliminary agreement between the Malian government, the 
CMA and the Platform armed groups movements (United Nations Security Council, 
S/2014/403). Four additional rounds of talks were held in the following months and in 
between these formal negotiation sessions, bilateral consultations were held between several 
parties and international mediators. The majority of key players mentioned before have had a 
role to play during these talks. It must be noted though that those groups labelled terrorist 
organizations by the Malian government and the international community were excluded 
from the peace process. Furthermore, civil society organizations and most traditional chiefs 
who are considered important local power holders, yet have no official role within the armed 
groups’ movements, were excluded from the peace process as well (Pezard and Shurkin, 
2015; ICG, 2015).          
 Several scholars and policy makers argue that a complication of mediation efforts has 
been the lack of agreement on who should be party to the negotiations, how negotiations 
should be conducted and what exactly should be discussed. Overall, these issues made peace 
talks arduous and some argue that the exclusion of all labelled terrorist organizations and 
other influential parties, such as traditional chiefs and civil society organizations, from the 
peace process “casts a shadow over the negotiations” and “it will be difficult to reach a peace 
agreement if mediators ignore individuals who are disreputable in the eyes of the 
international community, but influential in northern Mali” (ICG, 2015: 10).   
 At the beginning of this chapter it is argued that instability, insecurity and tensions in 
northern Mali remained high during the peace process. There were vast intercommunal and 
armed group clashes as many issues were not yet resolved between local communities and 
not yet addressed during peace negotiations. Consequently, the degree of fragmentation is 
high and it is highly unlikely all key parties are to be content with the peace process at all 
times. As such, progress and a lack of progress, or the perception of one or the other, at the 
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negotiating table causes factionalism. New groups are created as a means to get their specific 
interests included in negotiations when there is disagreement on the substance or scope of 
talks.            
 So, the high degree of fragmentation of key parties explain the vast amount of 
intercommunal clashes as does it explain why many key parties to the peace process split into 
several parties over time. Distinguishing between groups inside the peace process, thus the 
compliant armed groups (CAGs), and those parties outside of the peace process, whether or 
not these outside parties are willing to comply with the peace process or not, has become 
increasingly difficult. Additionally, distinctions between key parties and their factions 
become even more blurry as certain individuals of parties outside of the peace process are 
influential in the groups that are inside of the peace process.     
 There are two examples illustrative of this point. First, the leader of the terrorist 
organization Ansar Dine has many supporters within the HCUA, a group part of the CMA. 
Colonel MPP Timmermans states in an interview with the author that “there is a well-known 
hidden relationship between HCUA and Ansar Dine”.19 As such, concessions to the leader of 
Ansar Dine are most likely necessary in order to keep HCUA on board. Second, a former 
officer of MUJAO joined the MAA in order to gain leverage during negotiations. Hence, his 
group membership is “fluid” (ICG, 2015: 13). The dynamics between and within groups, thus 
the frequent changes of allegiances increases distrust, obscures exact interests and leads to a 
resurge in spoiling behavior as they all seek to “prove themselves to each other” and gain 
bargaining leverage for their specific interests in the peace process (Ibid: 12).   
 Spoiling behavior that has to do with factionalism is illustrated by spoiling event F; 
clashes between the MNLA and MAA groups of the CMA and the MAA group of the 
Platform in the Gao region in July and August of 2014. The MAA had split and these newly 
formed groups all sought to become a key player in peace negotiations in which they are able 
to bring additional players’ interests, such as the interests of the former officer of the 
MUJAO, to the table. According to the UN Secretary General, as a result of these acts of 
spoiling, the scope of peace negotiations was enlarged to include the negotiation of a 
cessation of hostilities agreement representative of all new interests (United Nations Security 
Council, S/2014/692: 2). After these interests were included in peace talks, a declaration of 
cessation of hostilities was signed reaffirming the commitment of parties to the peace process 
as set forth by the preliminary agreement.        
                                                            
19 Interview with Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA Force 
between February and December 2015, conducted by author on April 10, 2016. 
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 A different and final spoiling event that has to do with factionalism, more specifically, 
the grave internal divisions between and amongst the Malian armed groups underlying 
factionalism, occurred in the weeks before the signing of the Agreement on Peace and 
Reconciliation in Mali on June 20, 2015. Throughout the northern regions, armed clashes 
between and attacks by all CAG’s occurred leading up to the ceremony for the signing of the 
peace agreement (Spoiling event G). Internal divisions arose amongst the CAG’s  in response 
to the proposed peace agreement and they all sought to assert influence and make additional 
territorial and political gains (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4).   
 Tables 9 and 10 portray the causal pathways derived from data analysis and will 
subsequently be elaborated on in the text. 
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NORTHERN 
MALIAN 
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THE SCOPE 
OF PEACE 
NEGOTIA-
TIONS TO 
INCLUDE A 
CESSATION 
OF 
HOSTILITIES 
AGREEMENT 
REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF ALL 
NEW 
RELEVANT 
INTERESTS 
(United 
Nations 
Security 
Council, 
S/2014/692: 2).  
DECLARA-
TION OF 
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OF 
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SIGNED RE-
AFFIRMING 
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Council, 
S/2014/692: 2). 
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THE 
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TABLE 10: SPOILING EVENT G 
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 DISCLOSURE OF 
INFORMATION 
ON RELEVANT 
INTERESTS 
REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE CMA (RFI, 
2015; REUTERS, 
2015)   
 
 
INCREASE IN 
MEDIATION 
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THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TO 
KEEP ALL 
PARTIES, MOST 
NOTABLY THE 
CMA, ON BOARD 
(The Guardian, 
2015; United 
Nations Security 
Council, 
S/2015/426: 1-4; 
RFI, 2015). 
 
THE CMA 
GROUPS SIGN 
ON 20 JUNE, 
2015, THE 
PROPOSED 
PEACE 
AGREEMENT 
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SIGNED ON 15 
MAY, 2015, BY 
THE 
PLATFORM 
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THE MALIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
(ICG, 2015; The 
Guardian, 2015; 
United Nations 
Security Council, 
S/2015/426: 1; 
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SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES 
Due to these acts of spoiling resulting from factionalism it became clear there were new 
interests relevant to the peace process that had not been addressed before. These interests 
were assessed as relevant as they were representative of another significant size of the 
northern Malian population. It is problematic to assess the exact numbers of these factions in 
terms of who and how many they represent. Nonetheless, including as much factions as 
possible in peace negotiations increases the overall representativeness of the northern Malian 
population even though they only represent, when combined, fifteen percent of the overall 
population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).      
 The causal pathways between spoiling event F and the outcome of the peace process 
confirm the proposed hypotheses, at least in terms of the peace process remaining viable 
through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and acceptance of the peace 
process by the key parties involved. Nonetheless, even though spoiling behavior resulting 
from factionalism discloses information on these factions’ interests and their key players, it 
adds to overall instability and insecurity in line with findings on trends mentioned before. 
 When analyzing spoiling event G, hypotheses of information disclosure cannot be 
verified despite the fact that the peace process progressed in terms of the peace process 
remaining viable through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and 
acceptance of the peace process by the key parties involved. Analysis has shown that the role 
of the international community has been essential for this outcome to occur. As such and in 
line with the findings from paragraph 6.4.1.1. Spoiling and Terrorism, a new hypothesis and 
causal pathway arises that has to do with third party involvement. In paragraph 6.4.2. these 
findings on third party involvement will be further elaborated on. 
SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM: TRENDS 
An effect of spoiling event F was the formation of GATIA; a new Malian armed group 
allegedly connected to the Malian government (Raleigh et al, 2010, ACLED event no: 
916MLI / 50013). GATIA immediately clashed with other armed groups resulting in a 
deteriorating security situation in the northern regions and territorial take-overs (United 
Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 9-14). Consequently, implementing the provisions of 
the Ouagadougou Accord was hindered and the peace process did not progress.   
 Analysis has shown in previously discussed spoiling events that the overall 
deterioration of the security situation led to multiple requests by MINUSMA to the 
international community for additional resources. In this case, French forces acknowledged 
these requests and sent additional fighter jets in order to deter further insecurity (Raleigh et 
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al, 2010, ACLED event no: 974MLI / 50071). In the case of spoiling event G, MINUSMA 
reinforced its military presence in order to deter further insecurity as well (United Nations 
Security Council, S/2015/426: 4). Be that as it may, no data can be verified that these 
increases in resources resulted in an improved security situation, at least, not in the short 
term.            
 In the case of spoiling event G, there was also an increase in attacks on personnel of 
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), an increase in displaced persons and a gain in 
territory at the expense of the MDSF (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426; Human 
Rights Watch, 2015: 10-12; Raleigh et al, 2010, ACLED event no: 1061MLI / 50158, 
ACLED event no: 1033MLI / 50130). Hence, the peace process did not progress in terms of 
the implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement. 
6.4.2. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT 
Before concluding on the collected data on spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of 
the peace process, it is essential for the validity of the analysis and the establishment of 
causal relationships to consider an alternative explanation for the productivity and success of 
a peace process, namely third party involvement.     
 Throughout the civil war debate that has to do with civil war termination, a strong 
alternative explanation exists for the productivity and success of a peace process in which 
warring parties commit to laying down their arms through negotiated settlements, namely; 
third party involvement (Dixon, 2009). Third parties, such as the UN are posited as a solution 
to credible commitments problems because they can guarantee the security of those who give 
up arms (Walter, 2002). Additionally, they can be a mediator in negotiations and provide for 
resources aiding the peace process in general as I have shown with the example of El 
Salvador in chapter two and six.        
 Contemporary conflicts have often seen third parties offering their services in conflict 
resolution or peace processes. Prominent international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and small-state and non-state actors play key roles in “bringing parties to the 
negotiating table and creating much needed forums for dialogue and negotiation” (Babbitt 
and Hampson, 2011: 47). The role of third parties can differ throughout the peace processes, 
yet in most cases and at some point their presence is to be observed.    
 In Mali there has been significant third party involvement since its independence in 
1960 (Pezard and Shurkin, 2015: 12; Poulton and Youssouf, 1998: 14). Being a former 
French colony, the most important support for Mali’s peace and development has come from 
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Algeria and France (Poulton and Youssouf, 1998: 135). During the most recent rebellion, 
there has also been significant involvement from the UN and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), a pillar of the African Economic Community (AEC) which 
is part of the African Union (AU).         
 Analysis in previous paragraphs has shown that the disclosure of information by 
spoiling behavior is beneficial for the peace process irrespectively of the parties involved. 
These findings coincide with theories on third party involvement throughout the literature 
concerned with civil war termination. Third parties successfully promote and accommodate 
continued dialogue between key parties despite persistent insecurity. Most scholars agree that 
they are able to overcome credible commitment problems by guaranteeing that all parties 
hold up to their agreement (Walter, 2002).        
 In the case of spoiling event G though, third parties did not act upon the disclosure of 
information, yet peace negotiations still moved forward towards the actual signage of a peace 
agreement by all parties involved. So, in terms of the peace process progressing through 
ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and acceptance of the peace process 
by the key parties involved, a new hypothesis emerges narrowed in accordance with this 
scope. The peace process, in most spoiling events where data could be verified, did not 
progress in terms of implementing the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord. As such, an 
alternative hypothesis of third party involvement arises. 
H alternative: When third parties are involved during a peace process, peace negotiations 
will progress without acting upon the disclosure of information on new and relevant actors to 
the peace process by spoiling behavior. 
FIGURE 6: ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT 
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7. FROM CAUSAL PATHWAYS TO CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
Establishing a causal mechanism between spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace 
process means that causal relationships are made evident that not only explain the existence 
of the relationship, but also why and how this relationship comes into being. Throughout the 
analysis causal pathways were identified and it has become evident that an immediate effect 
of spoiling behavior is a disclosure of information on motives and military strength and 
capabilities. In general it can be argued that all violent acts disclose this type of information, 
however, in the case of spoiling when a violent act is committed with specific reference to the 
peace process, identifying motives, and subsequently interests, is most likely to occur as 
actors that spoil express why they spoil. So, the causal pathway between the IV spoiling 
behavior and the IVV’s 1A and 2A, disclosure of information on new interests and new 
actors is confirmed.         
 When it comes to IVV 1B and 2B; the assessment of relevant interests and actors, 
several complexities arose throughout the analysis. First of all, interests changed with the 
fragmentation of key parties. Yet, the size of the population representative of these interests 
did not change as the majority of northern ethnic groups remained represented in either one 
of the compliant armed groups or its factions. Second, the interests unrealizable for the peace 
process were from those armed groups excluded from the peace process, e.g. all terrorist 
groups as they demanded Mali to become a theocratic state under Sharia law. The MNLA and 
HCUA initially demanded self-determination, which was unrealizable as well. However, they 
adjusted their demands accordingly during peace negotiations. So, the assessment of relevant 
interests has been an ongoing effort throughout the peace process. As such, IVV 1B overlaps 
with IVV 1C; the inclusion of relevant interests in peace negotiations. This means that IVV 
1B and IVV 1C combined are the next causal step in terms of interests.   
 The third complexity in the analysis of IVV 1B and IVV2B has to do with the 
relevance of the willingness to negotiate of relevant actors. The actors that committed acts of 
spoiling were either already inside the peace process, thus part of one of the compliant armed 
groups or banned from the peace process, thus one of the terrorist groups. As such, assessing 
relevant actors based upon their willingness to negotiate seems futile. Nevertheless, the 
information on actors’ military strength and capabilities and their willingness or 
unwillingness to negotiate is disclosed as a result of their acts of spoiling. What does this 
mean then for assessing IVV 2C1 and 2C2; the inclusion of relevant actors willing to 
negotiate in peace negotiations and the weakening of those relevant actors unwilling to 
negotiate?           
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 Within the literature on spoiling behavior and as per proposed hypotheses, it is argued 
that those actors that are strong and willing to negotiate should be included in peace 
negotiations as they could pose a significant threat to the peace process when they are not 
engaged (Reiter, 2015). The peace process in Mali however does not accommodate this. And 
it does not need to as the majority of terrorist groups in Mali addressed throughout the 
analysis are unwilling to negotiate. However, some groups, most notably Ansar Dine, are 
frequently willing to negotiate. In line with proposed hypotheses this means that the peace 
process should not progress as IVV 2C1 is not met.      
 In terms of IVV 2C2, the peace process should also not progress, at least not 
significantly, as the Malian government, its armed forces and the international community 
through MINUSMA have not been able to significantly weaken these actors. This means that 
this specific causal pathway cannot be tested as such. However, as with IVV2C1, it is then 
expected that the peace process does not progress as IVV 2C2 is also not met.   
 Analysis has shown that acts of spoiling, after disclosing information on actors’ 
motives, interests, military strength and capabilities and their (un)willingness to negotiate, 
caused the peace process to progress, yet only through one of two proposed indicators: The 
conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process measured by the existence of 
dispute resolution mechanisms and active communication between various parties in which 
the goal is to clarify and resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict (Agoglia 
et al, 2010: 22).           
 The other indicator; political leaders’ and elites’ acceptance with and support of the 
peace process, is only met through measuring key parties’ renouncement and condemnation 
of the use of violence. It has not been met through measuring the number and severity of 
violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by faction (Ibid: 22-23). Even though the violation of 
cease-fire agreements, the hindered re-deployment of MDSF, the delayed return of basic civil 
services and the ineffective cantonment of combatants, were often immediate effects of 
spoiling behavior, thus mostly short term effects, it is not possible to ignore these effects of 
spoiling behavior unproductive for the peace process.     
 In sum of above findings, only the following causal mechanism, illustrated in Figure 
7, can be confirmed: 
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FIGURE 7: CONFIRMED CAUSAL MEHANISM OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
Instability, insecurity and tensions remained high during the peace process in Mali between 
2013 and 2015. The vast amount of violent acts, terrorism, factionalism and different 
immediate, short and long term effects increased the complexity of the analysis despite 
evident operationalization criteria for spoiling behavior and the indicators and measures for 
assessing whether or not a peace process progresses. These are not out of the ordinary 
circumstances though. Deeply rooted grievances between groups are often the cause for 
violent conflict and also the reason why violent conflicts endure (Collier and Sambanis, 2002: 
4-5). Private information and credible commitment problems exacerbate the situation as does 
the weakening of state capacity or “degradation of the state apparatus” (Kalyvas, 2007:416).
 The peace process in Mali is not yet at an end. Even though in 2015 the Agreement on 
Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was signed, implementing all provisions of the agreement 
and addressing and resolving grievances takes time. Achieving a durable peace is an immense 
challenge and managing violence throughout the peace process is a necessary evil. By 
conducting this research and answering the question: Under what conditions can spoiling 
behavior be productive for a peace process? my ultimate goal has been to assist 
policymakers in this task by providing for a deepened knowledge on spoiling behavior and its 
effects. Findings build on theories of spoiling behavior by making transparent the causal 
pathways between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process. So, what 
conclusions can be drawn and what recommendations can be made?   
 First, influential scholarship concerned with spoiling behavior assumes spoiling 
behavior has a detrimental effect on a peace process. And this is true. Analysis has shown 
that acts of spoiling increase instability, insecurity and tensions which hinders and delays the 
implementation of provisions of a peace agreement. Regardless of the continuation of the 
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implementation after measures have been taken, every delay or hindering is ineffective, hence 
must be considered unproductive.        
 Nonetheless, analysis has also shown that spoiling behavior discloses information on 
new actors, including their motives, interests and military strength and capabilities. The 
disclosure of this type of information is vital for a peace process, especially in terms of peace 
negotiations. So, a causal mechanism exists between spoiling behavior, its effects and the 
outcome of a peace process that is productive for the outcome of that peace process.  The 
disclosure of information relevant to the peace process is the first necessary, hence not 
sufficient condition. The following necessary condition for spoiling behavior to be productive 
for the peace process is the condition that peacemakers appropriately deal with that 
information as best as circumstances allow them to while equipped with knowledge provided 
by scholars and experts in the field.        
 Spoilers inside the peace process in Mali have mostly been pragmatic. They have tried 
to safeguard their interests in the peace process by using violence. As such, spoiling has been 
a bargaining tool and the effects fall anywhere short of actually failing the peace process. 
Those spoilers outside the peace process in Mali have also been pragmatic in terms of 
safeguarding their income. Notwithstanding, they have also been idealistic as they seek to 
establish a theocracy in Mali based upon Sharia law. It seems that when scholars concerned 
with spoiling behavior assume detrimental effects they are mostly right, yet only when the 
research focus is on the implementation of peace agreements. And this is irrespective of 
specific spoiler typologies.          
 This means two things. First, even though successful implementation of a peace 
agreement is vital for achieving progress towards a durable peace, a peace process cannot be 
reduced to provisions set forth in a peace agreement. Scholars should define and explain what 
is to be considered a failed or successful peace process in order to acknowledge the 
complexity of conflict resolution and to avoid negative rhetoric when there are other areas 
within the peace process that are progressing. Second, categorizing spoilers only makes sense 
when peace-makers have the ability to actually manage these spoilers. The peace process in 
Mali disregards those actors labeled terrorist groups in terms of peace negotiations whether or 
not they are categorized as relevant. Spoiler typology remains in theory essential for the 
management of spoilers, but in practice not so much.     
 It has also become clear through this research that third party involvement is 
beneficial for the peace process. They are able to keep key parties on track and act as an 
efficient mediator in peace negotiations. These findings confirm existing data in the literature 
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that has to do with third party involvement and civil war termination. It cannot however be 
considered a well-suited alternative explanation for a peace process progressing within the 
context of this research. Acts of spoiling still disclose information whether or not third parties 
are involved. Subsequently, third party involvement is a part of the proposed causal 
mechanism as no distinction is made between the peace-makers that have to deal with the 
disclosed information. So, third party involvement is the condition that enhances the 
necessary condition of appropriately dealing with the information disclosed by spoiling 
behavior.          
 Finally, one must remain critical when assessing the overall progress of a peace 
process. Throughout this research several trends emerged indicative of a peace process 
progressing in terms of measuring a viable peace process through ongoing dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Other trends were also visible that were not the preferred trends for a peace 
process progressing and mostly had to do with the implementation of provisions of the 
Ouagadougou Accord. So, progress in peace negotiations does not automatically mean 
progress in, for example, returning basic civil services to the population or increasing security 
throughout the country. It is not clear though which trend outweighs other trends and despite 
the research challenge this brings about when interested in measuring overall progress, it re-
affirms the complex nature of a peace process and it forces scholars and policy makers to be 
realistic in their expectations.         
 In Mali, peace negotiations became more effective after acts of spoiling had disclosed 
information on relevant interests and actors, resulting in a signed peace agreement. Peace 
makers should look for this information in order to turn a negative act of spoiling into a 
positive outcome as much as possible. Nevertheless, instability, insecurity and tensions 
remained high as a result of spoiling behavior and other violent acts and caused hindering and 
delays in implementation of the provisions of the preliminary agreement. As such, it can be 
argued that political progress does not meet with other, more humanitarian efforts. And this 
awareness is crucial for all peace makers who seek overall progress in the peace process 
while working towards achieving a durable peace. 
  
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
75 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Agence France-Presse. “Mali Rebels suspend Talks with Government: statement.” Published by 
Agence France-Presse, Ouagadougou, 27 September 2013(a). 
Agence France-Presse. “Tuareg, Arab Rebels resume Mali Peace Talks.” Published by Agence France-
Presse, Ouagadougou, 5 October 2013(b). 
Agence France-Presse. “Mali armed groups say they agree to peace talks.” Published by Agence 
France-Presse, Algiers, 14 June 2014(a). 
Agence France-Presse. “Mali Government, rebels begin tough peace talks in Algiers.” Published by 
Agence France-Presse, Algiers, 17 July 2014(b). 
Agence France-Presse. “Separatists vow to speak with single voice in Mali talks.” Published by 
Agence France-Presse, Algiers, 14 September 2014(c). 
Agoglia et al. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) A Metrics Framework. Edited by: 
J. Agoglia, M. Dziedzic and B. Sotirin, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010. 
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, 20 June 2015. Published by United Nations 
Peacemaker, http://peacemaker.un.org/node/2681. 
Al Jazeera. “Suicide bombers attack Mali’s Timbuktu.” Updated on 29 September 2013. Accessed on 
22 April 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/suicide-bombers-attack-mali-
timbuktu-20139291355237219.html. 
Babbitt, E. “The Evolution of International Conﬂict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding.” 
Negotiation Journal 25 (2009): 539–549. 
Babbitt, E and Hampson, F.O. “Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing Theory.” 
International Studies Review 13 (2011): 46-57. 
BBC NEWS. “Mali Crisis; Key Players.” Updated on 12 March 2013(a). Accessed on 2 March 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17582909. 
BBC NEWS. “MNLA rebels attack soldiers in Kidal.” Updated on 30 September, 2013(b). Accessed on 
22 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24324122. 
Bercovitch, J. and Kremenyuk, V and Zartman, W.I. Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and Conflict 
Resolution. In The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, edited by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor 
Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers, 2009. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
76 
 
Blaydes, L. and De Maio, J. “Spoiling the Peace? Peace Process Exclusivity and Political Violence in 
North Central Africa.” Civil Wars 12 (2010): 3-28. 
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Fact Book; Mali.” Accessed 10 April 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html. 
Chauzal, G. and van Damme, T. “The roots of Mali’s conflict. Moving beyond the 2012 crisis.” CRU 
Report published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 2015.  
Collier, D. “Understanding Process Tracing”. Political Science and Politics 44 (2011): 823-830. 
Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. “Understanding Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 3-12. 
Darby, J. The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2001. 
Dixon, J. “Emerging Consensus: Results from the Second Wave of Statistical Studies on Civil War 
Termination.” Civil Wars 11 (2009): 121-136. 
Fearon, J.D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (1995): 379-414. 
Findley, M.G. “Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 57 (2012): 905-932. 
Guelke, A. “Negotiations and Peace Processes” in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace 
Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, edited by J. Darby and R. MacGinty, New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008: 63-77.  
Greenhill, K. and Major, S. “The Perils of Proﬁling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate 
Peace Accords.” International Security 31 (2007): 7–40. 
Halperin, S. and Heath, O. Political Research. Methods and Practical Skills. New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
Hampson, F.O. Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail. Washington DC, US Institute 
of Peace Press, 1996. 
Hogland, K. and Zartman, W.I. “Violence by the State: Official Spoilers and their Allies.” In Violence 
and Reconstruction, edited by J. Darby. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
77 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Mali: Justice Crucial to Peace Talks.” Published by Human Rights Watch, 10 
November 2014. 
Human Rights Watch. “Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population.” Published by Human Rights 
Watch, 14 April 2015. 
Institute for Security Studies. “Is Cantonment the Key to Success in Mali’s Negotiations?” Published 
by Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 
International Crisis Group. “Mali: Last Chance in Algiers?” Crisis Group Africa Policy Briefing 104 
Published by International Crisis Group, Dakar/Brussels, 18 November 2014. 
International Crisis Group. “Mali : la paix à marche forcée ? Mali: Last Chance in Algiers?” Crisis 
Group Africa Policy Briefing 226, published by International Crisis Group, Dakar/Brussels, 22 May 
2015  
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). “Northern Mali: Work resumes in countryside as 
search for staff continues.” Published by the ICRC, 3 April, 2014(a), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2014/03-26-mali-abduction-luedi.html.  
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). “Mali: Civilians suffering effects of recent fighting 
in Kidal.” Published by the ICRC, 30 May, 2014(b), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2014/05-28-mali-fighting-water-displaced-
wounded-detainees.htm. 
Jeune Afrique. “Mali: Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh cree la Coalition due people pour l’Azawad 
(CPA).” Updated on 19 March 2014. Accessed on 10 April 2016, 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/164896/politique/mali-ibrahim-ag-mohamed-assaleh-cr-la-coalition-
du-peuple-pour-l-azawad-cpa/. 
Keesing’s Record of World Events. “Security Developments.” Volume 59, Issue 10, page 52951, 2013. 
Kalyvas, S. N. “Civil War.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by C. Boix and S.C. 
Stokes, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007): 416-434. 
Kirshner, S. “Knowing your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 54 (2010): 745-770. 
Kreutz, J. “How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.” 
Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010): 243-250. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
78 
 
Mattes, M. and Savun, B. “Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War 
settlements.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (2010): 511-524. 
Newman, E; Richmond, O.P. “Obstacles to Peace Processes: Understanding Spoiling” in Challenges to 
Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution, edited by E. Newman and O.P.  
Richmond, New York, United Nations University Press, 2006.  
Nilsson, D. and Kovacs, M.S. “Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in 
Peace Processes.” International Studies Review 13 (2011): 606-626. 
Nyirabikali, G. “Mali Peace Accord: Actors, issues and their representation.” Report published by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Updated on 15 August 2015. Accessed on 11 
March 2016, http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/aug-15-mali-peace-accord. 
Ouagadougou Accord, 13 June 2013. Published by United Nations Peacemaker, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013. 
Pearlman, W. “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace 
Process.” International Security 33 (2009): 79-109. 
Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. “Achieving Peace in Northern Mali. Past Agreements, Local Conflicts and 
the Prospects for a Lasting Settlement.” Report published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 
California, USA, 2015. 
Poulton, R.E. and Youssouf, I. A Peace of Timbuktu. Democratic Governance, Development and 
African Peacemaking. Geneva, United Nations Publications, 1998. 
Radio France International. “Mali signs half-baked peace deal without main ingredients: Tuareg 
rebels. Updated on 15 May 2015. Accessed on 24 May 2016, http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20150515-mali-
signs-half-baked-peace-deal-without-main-ingredients-tuareg-rebels-MNLA-Azawad-separatism-
Bamako. 
Raleigh, C ; Linke A; Hegre, H; Karlsen, J. “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data. Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010): 651-660. 
Reiter, A.G. “Does Spoiling Work? Assessing the Impact of Spoilers on Civil War Peace Agreements.” 
Civil Wars 17 (2015): 89-111. 
Reuters. “Mali rebels reject proposed peace deal and demand more talks.” Updated 16 March 2015. 
Accessed 24 May 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-talks-idUSKBN0MC0WD20150316. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
79 
 
Sambanis, N. “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on 
Civil War”. Defence and Peace Economics 13 (2002): 215-243. 
Sisk, T.D. “Political Violence and Peace Accords: Searching for the Silver Lining” in Violence and 
Reconstruction, edited by J. Darby, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 2006. 
START; the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Movement 
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).” Updated on January 2015. Accessed on April 22 
2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/movement-oneness-and-jihad-west-africa-
mujao.  
Stedman, S.G. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22 (1997): 5-53. 
Steenkamp, C. Violence and Post-war Reconstruction: Managing Insecurity in the Aftermath of Peace 
Accords. London, I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 2009. 
The Atlantic. “The new Terrorist Training Ground.” Published October 2013. Accessed on 24 May 
2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/the-new-terrorist-training-
ground/309446/.  
The Guardian. “Mali Red Cross team abducted by Islamists.” Published by the Guardian, 11 February 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/11/mali-red-cross-team-
abducted-islamists-movement-oneness-jihad. 
The Guardian. “Mali peace deal a welcome development, but will it work this time?” Updated May, 
2015. Accessed on 20 May 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/jul/01/mali-peace-deal-a-welcome-development-but-will-it-work-this-time. 
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali. 
S/2013/582. New York, USA, 2013. 
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali. 
S/2014/229. New York, USA, 2014. 
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali. 
S/2014/403. New York, USA, 2014. 
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali. 
S/2014/692. New York, USA, 2014. 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
80 
 
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali. 
S/2015/219. New York, USA, 2015. 
United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. “Ceasefire Agreement between Mali 
Government. Armed Groups Opens Narrow Window of opportunity for Peace. Under-Secretary-
General tells Security Council.” SC/11443 United Nations Security Council, 2014. 
United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. “Urging end to Ceasefire Violations, Under-
Secretary-General tells Security Council Peace Talks between Mali Government, Armed Groups at 
Crucial Stage.” SC/11726, United Nations Security Council, 2015. 
United Nations University. The impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes. By Newman, E. and Richmond, 
O. Tokyo, Japan, 2006. 
Waldner, D. “Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Inference.” Security Studies, 24 (2015), 239-250.  
Walter, B.F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars: Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2002. 
Walter, B.F. “Re-conceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process”. International 
Negotiation 7 (2003): 299-311.  
Walter, B.F. “Bargaining Failures and Civil War.” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 243-
261.  
Wantchekon, L. “Strategic Violence in Conditions of Political Instability: The 1994 Elections in El 
Salvador.” Comparative Political Studies 32 (1999): 810-834. 
Waugh, C.M. Charles Taylor and Liberia: Ambition and Atrocity in Africa’s Lone Star State. London: 
Zed Books Ltd, 2011. 
Weiss, C. “Ansar Dine Highlights attack on Tuareg separatists in Mali.” Published by the Long War 
Journal, 26 January 2016. Accessed on 30 April 2016, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/ansar-dine-highlights-attack-on-tuareg-
separatists-in-mali.php 
Weiss, T.G. and Welz, T. “The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?” 
International Affairs 90 (2014): 889-905.  
Zahar, M.J. “Understanding the Violence of Insiders: Loyalty, Custodians of Peace, and the 
Sustainability of Conflict Settlement” in Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during 
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
81 
 
Conflict Resolution, edited by E. Newman and O.P. Richmond. Tokyo: United Nations University Press 
(2006).   
DAFNA DEMPSEY           MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT 
 THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015. 
82 
 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following questions are designed to gain in-depth knowledge of the situation on the 
ground in general during the peace process in Mali and to triangulate available data on 
specific spoiling events as a means to confirm or disconfirm the available data. The 
information obtained from these questions will also be used as background information on 
the peace process in Mali in order to enhance validity of this research. 
This research starts temporally in June, 2013 after the signage of the Declaration of 
accession to the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace 
talks, also known as the Ouagadougou Accord, which marks the start of the peace process 
(as per operationalization criteria discussed in the research proposal) and ends when the 
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was signed in June, 2015. 
The research question I pursue to answer is: Under what conditions can spoiling behavior be 
productive for a peace process? As such, I am interested in the short and long term effects of 
spoiling behavior and the causality between these effects and the outcome of a peace 
process. Spoiling behavior is defined as: Violent actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, 
or delay a peace process.          
 In order to distinguish spoiling behavior from the vast amount of violent acts 
conducted throughout the peace process, the focus of data collection has been on those 
violent acts in which reference has been made to the peace process, e.g. peace negotiations, 
implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord etc.20  
The first three questions are concerned with the role of the interviewee during the peace 
process and are solely used for purposes off the record. The interviewees, when cited, will be 
referenced as an anonymous source, unless interviewees confirm their willingness to be cited 
by name and/or the role and duty they performed during the peace process. The remainder 
of questions is organized around three specific events or themes: spoiling and terrorism, 
spoiling and discontent and spoiling and factionalism. 
1. What was your role and duty during the peace process in Mali?  
2. From which locations did you exercise this role and when did your duty commence 
and end? 
3. Do you want to remain anonymous? If not, please note how you want to be 
referenced. 
 
                                                            
20 The subjectivity of this focus as it is mostly dependent upon secondary sources has been noted as a 
limitation to this research 
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SPOILING AND TERRORISM 
4. Throughout the peace process several Islamist groups, such as Ansar Dine, the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO), Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), Signed in Blood Battalion and the Islamist Movement for Azawad 
(IMA) have conducted violent attacks on civilians and groups inside the peace 
process, hence part of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), the Platform 
and/or the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). These violent attacks 
include, yet are not limited to, bombings, assassinations and kidnappings and they are 
argued to pose a severe threat to the peace process and the implementation of the 
provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord. Most of these Islamist groups have 
been labelled as terrorist organizations by the Malian government and international 
community and are excluded from peace negotiations.     
 A short term effect of these acts of spoiling and terror is an increase in tensions 
and fear amongst and between political movements and the local population. The 
insecure and instable situation has caused difficulties and delays in the 
implementation of certain provisions of the preliminary agreement, such as the 
establishment of cantonment sites and the return of basic civil services. Accordingly, 
it can be argued that these acts of spoiling and terror hinder the peace process.  
 A long term effect of these acts of spoiling and terror has to do with the 
response of the international community as they become increasingly aware of the 
military strength of these terrorist groups and the challenge they pose to the peace 
process. As such, it can be argued that these acts of spoiling and terror clarify the need 
for additional resources which in turn can be considered productive for the peace 
process.  
 
Do you agree with these statements? What effects have you observed in the short and 
long term after acts of spoiling and terror and how do these effects relate to the peace 
process? What has been the response of MINUSMA and the international community 
to these acts of spoiling and terror? 
 
SPOILING AND DISCONTENT 
5. Substantial spoiling acts occurred between 16 and 21 May, 2014 in the city of Kidal 
when hostilities broke out between the signatories of the Ouagadougou Accord, 
namely the MDSF and the MNLA. Several sources indicate that the latter group had 
expressed concern prior the clashes about the slow pace of implementation of the 
preliminary agreement and that both parties accused each other of hindering the 
implementation of provisions.        
 According to a report published by International Crisis Group, the political 
armed groups’ defeat of the Malian Army relaunched the peace process by changing 
the balance of power between the government and the armed groups. It is argued that 
the relevance of these groups increased and made clear to the Malian government that 
their position had become vulnerable and that dialogue needed to be renewed. 
Subsequently, peace negotiations, mediated by Algiers, resumed and certain 
preconditions of the preliminary agreement were altered in accordance with the 
interests of the MNLA and affiliated armed groups. 
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Do you agree with this statement or has the renewed dialogue resulted from other 
forces at play? What have been other short or long term effects of the defeat of the 
Malian Army in the city of Kidal? 
 
SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM 
6. Throughout the peace process, allegiances between and within groups frequently have 
changed. The high degree of factionalism is argued to increase distrust, obscure the 
exact interests of groups and lead to a resurge in spoiling behaviour as these newly 
formed groups seek to prove themselves to each other. An example of this kind of 
spoiling behaviour is illustrated by the clashes between the MNLA and MAA groups 
of the CMA and the MAA group of the Platform in the Gao region in July and August 
of 2014. The MAA had fractioned, thus additional players’ interests became an issue. 
Several sources indicate that as a result of these clashes, the scope of peace 
negotiations was enlarged to include the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities 
agreement representative of all new interests.  
 
Do you agree with this statement? What are the main reasons for factionalism during 
the peace process and how adaptable is the peace process to the ever changing 
dynamics between and amongst relevant parties? 
 
 
